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ABSTRACT
This article examines the limitations of the application of
traditional information privacy theory to disputes relating to
modern technologies. If information privacy is understood as
an individual’s right to full control over his information,
activities involving the collection, process and use of personal
data cannot be conducted without the data subject’s consent
because his privacy rights would be affected as a result of such
activities. Instead of the privacy interest approach, this article
introduces a privacy harm approach to reconcile the defects of
traditional privacy theory. The privacy interest approach helps
identify situations in which an individual’s information privacy
conflicts with the free flow of information, and the privacy
harm approach comes into play to precisely evaluate and
determine the reasonable extent of protection of the respective
interest.
This article applies this privacy-harm-oriented
approach to Taiwan Taipei High Administrative Court
Judgment, Tsai v. NHIA, to examine that the modified
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information privacy theory is helpful to resolve the information
privacy dispute at issue.
This article elaborates the reasons why imposing a
universal rule that the data controller must obtain the data
subject’s consent before using his health data is of no real help
in protecting health privacy and is detrimental to medical
research. This notion can be supported by the following
concepts: 1. shifting the liability of privacy protection to the
data subject will increase the risk of privacy invasion; 2. in the
multi-faceted privacy interest concept, granting decisionmaking rights to an individual cannot guarantee privacy
protection; 3. it will add unreasonable costs to medical
research.
By applying the privacy harm approach, this article
further analyzes the importance of considering the likelihood of
privacy harm regarding health information. In this approach,
because identifiable health information and identified health
information are subject to different likelihoods of privacy harm,
different degrees of privacy protection and privacy rules should
apply to them in their respective contexts.
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I. Introduction
Health information has always been regarded as highly
sensitive personal data. 1 Any unwanted or unauthorized
exposure of such data would cause significant harm to the
subject of the data.2 For instance, people do not want others to
know that they carry certain physical or emotional diseases,
such as sexually transmitted diseases, or that they have
Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (“AIDS”). If such
personal health information is exposed, the individual will
inevitably suffer emotional pain or unfavorable treatment in
his social life or work. For example, an insurance company
might establish a higher insurance premium based on the
exposed health information even though this information is
irrelevant to the scope of insurance coverage. Likewise, the
likelihood of an individual obtaining a loan from a bank would
be reduced if information that is socially regarded as unhealthy
1 For purpose of this article, the terms “personal data” and “personal
information” are used interchangeably, and do not refer to different
definitions.
2 See Lawrence O. Gostin, Health Information Privacy, 80 CORNELL L.
REV. 451, 454 (1995).
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is disclosed.3
Modern technology has significantly increased the risk of
the unwanted exposure or dissemination of personal health
information. Previously, when medical or health information
was recorded on printed papers, a patient’s health condition or
medical treatment history was communicated privately
between patients and doctors or medical facilities. A person
could trust that health information was secure within this
special relationship (confidentiality) between the physician and
the patient. However, technological advances have changed the
landscape in which medical records are recorded and stored.
The flow of this sensitive information is no longer limited to
patients and medical service providers.4 With the widespread
use of internet technology and mobile devices, medical records
that are produced and maintained in digital formats can be
easily transmitted without temporal or territorial constraints.5
The more easily personal health information can be accessed
and distributed, the larger the number of parties that can
obtain this information to process, analyze and use it for their
own purposes. Increasing numbers of resources have been
dedicated to research to develop more advanced and evolved
technology to improve the efficiency of the use of personal
health information.6 These phenomena have made health data
more vulnerable to unwanted disclosure and have made
patient/physician confidentiality less reliable with regard to
health information privacy.
Modern technology has increased the difficulty of
protecting privacy with respect of health data due to the rapid
and broad information flow. However, it is also true that the
collective use of individuals’ health data may aid medical
3 DANIEL J. SOLOVE & PAUL SCHWARTZ, INFORMATION PRIVACY LAW 399
(4th ed. 2011).
4 See Gostin, supra note 2, at 512.
5 See generally Patricia Sánchez Abril & Anita Cava, Health Privacy in a
Techno-Social World: a Cyber-Patient’s Bill of Rights, 6 NW. J. TECH. &
INTELL. PROP. 244 (2008).
6 Fred H. Cate, Protecting Privacy in Health Research: The Limits of
Individual Choice, 98 CAL. L. REV. 1765, 1782 (2010) (“The rise of cheap,
mobile, and pervasive computing technologies that allow continuous, instant,
and ubiquitous access to information is facilitating a new paradigm in which
technology pushes healthcare delivery out of the clinical setting and into
patients’ everyday lives.”).
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research and improve medical science to benefit people.7 The
new big data technology facilitates medical research; however,
sufficient data must be supplied to make the big data
technology functional.8 No medical research can be successful
without a sizable database that accumulates sufficient data for
a certain length of time.9
Tsai v. NHIA, 10 a recent and high profile lawsuit in
Taiwan, illustrates the conflict between the benefits for
medical research of using all citizens’ medical data and the
privacy threats to individuals when their medical records are
exposed to others, and their most sensitive personal data are
disclosed without their knowledge. This article will examine
the relevant privacy issues in Tsai and will discuss whether the
traditional privacy theory that was applied to try this case is
still adequate to resolve privacy issues involving the use of
modern technologies.
The debate in Tsai is whether health authorities may use
personal health information that they have collected in the
course of performing national healthcare services for other

See id. at 1778.
According to the report of “Beyond the HIPAA Privacy Rule,” the
advantages of information-based health research include that:
It is often faster and less expensive than experimental studies; it
can analyze very large sets of data and may detect unexpected
phenomena or differences among subpopulations that might not
be included in a controlled experimental study; it can often be
undertaken when controlled trials are simply not possible for
ethical, technical, or other reasons, and it can be used to study
effectiveness of a specific test or intervention in clinical practice,
rather than just the efficacy as determined by a controlled
experimental study. It can also reexamine data accrued in other
research studies, such as clinical trials, to answer new questions
quickly and inexpensively.
COMM. ON HEALTH RESEARCH & THE PRIVACY OF HEALTH INFO.: THE HIPAA
PRIVACY RULE, IOM, BEYOND THE HIPAA PRIVACY RULE: ENHANCING PRIVACY,
IMPROVING HEALTH THROUGH RESEARCH 118 (Sharyl J. Nass et al. eds., 2009),
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK9578/.
9 See generally Frank Pasquale & Tara Adams Ragone, Protecting
Health Privacy in an Era of Big Data Processing and Cloud Computing, 17
STAN. TECH. L. REV. 595 (2014); Nicolas Terry, Protecting Patient Privacy in
the Age of Big Data, 81 UMKC L. REV. 385 (2012); Cate, supra note 6, at
1778-83.
10 Tsai v. NHIA, FǍ YUÁN FǍLǛ WǍNG (法源法律網) [LAWBANK], No. 102Su-36 (Taipei High Admin. Ct. May 14, 2014) [hereinafter Tsai, 102-Su-36].
7
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purposes, such as allegedly promoting public welfare, without
obtaining consent from the data subjects. What makes this
case more complicated is that the plaintiffs whose health data
were disclosed by the health agency were not unaware that the
health agency had used their personal data. The data subjects
strongly expressed their objections to the health agency’s use of
their personal data for purposes that were not communicated
to them when they gave their consent. Before filing the
lawsuit, the plaintiffs expressly requested that the health
authority should refrain from using their health data.
Tsai involves a dilemma of two conflicting rights. The data
subject plaintiffs alleged that they were exercising their
privacy rights granted in the Taiwan Constitution and the
privacy laws against intrusion of privacy. They added that this
case did not involve just any data; their health data were at
stake, and such highly sensitive information deserves greater
privacy and protection. The defendant, the Taiwan National
Health Insurance Administration, contested that it was
reusing all citizens’ health data that it previously collected
with the goal of improving public healthcare services and
devising healthcare policies that could benefit all citizens. Part
II of this article will provide a background summary of the
facts and court decisions on this dispute and will identify the
relevant interests at stake.
In Part III, this article introduces the relevant privacy
laws and regulations in Taiwan and the United States (U.S.)
related to health information, and conducts a comparative law
analysis that applies those respective States’ laws and
regulations to Tsai. In both jurisdictions, the relevant laws
dictate that an individual’s right to full control over his own
data could be sacrificed when the competing interest trumps
privacy rights, and there is no exception for sensitive health
data. This policy decision might be acceptable, but it requires
justifications as to why a fundamental human right that enjoys
stricter protection in civil law countries can be compromised.
The current privacy theory does not afford an adequate
explanation in this respect, and does not support this policy
decision. The current privacy theory was developed based on
the notion of protecting fundamental human rights (e.g.,
privacy rights), and has always viewed fundamental human
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rights as priority rights. To bridge the gap between the current
privacy theory and privacy laws and regulations, it is time to
reconsider whether the conventional privacy theory is still
adequate to resolve new privacy disputes. For instance, in
terms of health data, the laws in both jurisdictions exclude
non-personally identifiable information (Non-PII) and limit
privacy protection to personally identifiable information (PII)
only. There is nothing wrong with excluding Non-PII from
privacy protection, but this article notes that it could be
problematic to apply a universal standard to all PII without
taking into account different circumstances of data use.
Conventional privacy theory does not support an approach that
views PII in different contexts to address the issue regarding
the occasions on which a data controller may use personal
health data for medical research. A new approach is required
to facilitate medical research and to ensure at the data
subjects’ rights are not infringed to the most reasonable extent
possible.
Given the above problem, in Part IV, this article examines
the limitations of the application of traditional privacy theory
to disputes relating to modern technologies and proposes
modifications to the traditional privacy theory. The first step is
to correctly identify the effects to information privacy caused by
new technologies and to correctly identify the rationale to offer
protection. Based on this foundation, this article proposes a
methodology to construe a modified concept of information
privacy and applies this concept in Tsai to examine whether
the proposed methodology is helpful to resolve the information
privacy dispute at issue. This article recognizes that the
concept of privacy is dynamic and multi-faceted. Instead of
pursuing a definition that is universally applicable, a practical
approach would involve categorizing privacy in different
contexts.
U.S. legal practice supports this article’s proposition that
privacy cannot be categorized into one simple concept that is
applicable to all cases. In adjudicating privacy disputes, the
U.S. Supreme Court recognizes that privacy is a multifaceted
concept that can be divided into three categories: decisional
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privacy, spatial (or physical) privacy and information privacy.11
Echoing the U.S. Supreme Court’s position, the Taiwan
Constitutional Court declared that the privacy right under
Article 22 of the Taiwan Constitution refers to the right to
protect one’s “spatial (or physical) privacy right” and one’s
“information privacy right.”12
The next question is how to appropriately categorize
privacy in different contexts. The approach currently adopted
by both the U.S. Supreme Court and the Taiwan Constitutional
Court falls short in dealing with information privacy issues,
and requires updates and modifications.
Currently, the
determining factors for categorizing privacy issues hinge on the
nature of the relevant privacy interest or interests. There are
flaws in the characterization of privacy based on related
interests. This methodology is subject to a great risk of
overestimating the need to protect privacy, and is likely to
underestimate the need for protection of others’ rights and
public welfare.
For example, if information privacy is
understood as an individual’s right to full control over his
information, then activities involving the collection, process
and use of personal data cannot be conducted without the data
subject’s consent because his privacy rights would be affected
as a result of such activities.
Instead of the privacy interest approach, this article
introduces a privacy harm approach to reconcile the defects of
traditional privacy theory. The privacy interest approach is
based on the presumed right that every person should retain
full control over his personal information. The traditional
information privacy right is understood in this concept as
meaning that each person has a presumed interest in having
full control over his personal information, and this interest
should be protected in all circumstances. However, even if one
cannot fully control one’s personal data, it should not be
concluded that the subject of that data’s release has suffered
privacy harm. This article proposes another approach to
construing the concept of privacy that emphasizes the context
of privacy harm. Privacy harm has been an important factor in

11
12

See infra Section IV.A.
See infra Section IV.A.
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U.S. torts law for adjudicating privacy in invasion claims.13
This article introduces the privacy harm approach to
supplement and modify privacy theory but does not attempt to
abolish the privacy interest approach. Privacy interest and
privacy harm represent two crucial faces of privacy protection.
Privacy interest represents the positive face of privacy
regarding the benefits of privacy protection. To devise a
privacy policy, it is essential that the interests of privacy
protection should be demonstrated at the outset to achieve
support for such a policy. In contrast, privacy harm is an
important factor in balancing possible conflicts between an
individual’s subjective expectation of privacy protection and the
objective standard of whether privacy harm actually exists
from society’s perspective. Only when both elements are
satisfied can one invoke the individual’s right to privacy
protection.
A two-layer analysis that adopts both the privacy interest
and privacy harm tests is of particular importance to construct
the theory of information privacy. The core of information
privacy protection lies in one’s right to control one’s personal
data. Nonetheless, recognizing the interests of information
privacy does not mean that all types of personal data deserve
full and equal protection. Different types of personal data and
different levels of secrecy associated with a subject’s data
naturally affect the likelihood for data use to cause privacy
harm and the scale of damage incurred. In other words, the
privacy interest approach helps to identify situations in which
an individual’s information privacy conflicts with the free flow
of information, and the privacy harm approach comes into play
to precisely evaluate and determine the reasonable extent of
protection of the respective interest. This article applies this
13
See William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383, 389 (1960)
(proposing four types of privacy harm in the U.S. tort law: 1. Intrusion:
“Intrusion upon the plaintiff’s seclusion or solitude, or into his private
affairs”; 2. “Public disclosure of private facts: Public disclosure of
embarrassing private facts about the plaintiff”; 3. False light: “Publicity
which places the plaintiff in a false light in the public eye”; 4. Appropriation:
“Appropriation, for the defendant’s advantage, of the plaintiff’s name or
likeness.”) The above four types of privacy harm were later recognized in the
Restatement (Second) of Torts, edited by Prosser, which are now generally
accepted tort law concepts. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A
(1977).
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privacy-harm-oriented approach to real cases to examine
whether this approach is helpful in resolving information
privacy disputes.
In Part V, this article elaborates the reasons why imposing
a universal rule that the data controller must obtain the data
subject’s consent before using his health data will impede
medical research rather than providing a pathway to protecting
health privacy. This approach is of no real help in protecting
health privacy and is detrimental to medical research. This
notion can be supported by the following concepts: 1. shifting
the liability of privacy protection to the data subject will
increase the risk of privacy invasion; 2. in the multi-faceted
privacy interest concept, granting decision-making rights to an
individual cannot guarantee privacy protection; 3. it will add
unreasonable costs to medical research.14
By applying the privacy harm approach, this article
further analyzes the importance of considering the likelihood of
privacy harm regarding health information. In this approach,
because identifiable health information and identified health
information are subject to different likelihoods of privacy harm,
different degrees of privacy protection and privacy rules should
apply to them in their respective contexts.15 Since identifiable
information cannot be directly linked to a certain person, the
risk of privacy harm associated with identifiable information is
naturally less than the risk with identified information. To
protect the interest of the free flow of personal information,
there is no reasonable basis to apply the rigid privacy rules
that were designed for identified information to identifiable
information. A general rule for the design of specific rules for
privacy protection should be that the greater the likelihood
that the information can be linked to a certain person and the
greater the risk of an individual’s personal identity being
exposed, the greater the amount of protection should be
granted to ensure an individual’s right to control his personal
information.
Lastly, this article provides an evaluation of the core issue
of Tsai: whether it is a prerequisite for the data controller to

14
15

See infra Section V.A.
See infra Section V.B.
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obtain the data subject’s consent in disclosing or using personal
health information when conducting medical research. This
article proposes that the personal information at issue should
be regarded as “key-coded information” that should be
categorized as identifiable information, and the disclosure or
use of such data is unlikely to result in the same degree of
privacy harm as what would be caused by identified
information. 16 As such, it is not necessary to apply the
informed consent principle. Tsai provides an opportunity to
examine whether the court has correctly applied and
interpreted Item 5 of Article 16 of the Taiwan Personal Data
Protection Act (“PDPA”), wherein the data controller may
freely reuse personal data for research purposes if such data
A reasonable
“cannot identify a certain person.” 17
interpretation of this clause, as proposed in this article, should
be interpreted as the inability to “directly identify a certain
person.” Based on this interpretation, as long as the health
agency has processed the personal data in such a way that the
data cannot directly identify the plaintiff, the health agency
may use or disclose the plaintiff’s health data for research
purposes without obtaining prior consent from the plaintiff.
II. Privacy Controversy over the Taiwan National Health
Database — Examining the Taiwan Taipei High
Administrative Court Judgment No. 102-Su-36
A. Background
Taiwan launched a national health insurance (“NHI”)
program in 1995 to provide health insurance coverage and
medical care benefits to Taiwanese nationals and foreigners
working in Taiwan.18 As of 2015, following two decades of its
See infra Section V.C.
Gèrén zīliào bǎohù fǎ ( 個 人 資 料 保 護 法 ) [Personal Information
Protection Act] FǍ YUÁN FǍLǛ WǍNG (法源法律網) [LAWBANK], Dec. 30, 2015
(Taiwan),
http://db.lawbank.com.tw/ENG/FLAW/FLAWDAT01.asp?lsid=FL010627
[hereinafter PDPA] (The PDPA is originally in Taiwanese. The PDPA is also
called Personal Information Protection Act in some Taiwan law databases
when said law is translated in English. There is no official English version or
translation of PDPA in Taiwan.).
18 National Health Insurance Administration Ministry of Health and
16

17
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implementation, 99.9% of Taiwan’s population is enrolled in
the program. 19 The NHI program is administered by the
Taiwan National Health Insurance Administration (NHIA), the
Ministry of Health and Welfare (MHW) of the Executive Yuan
(formerly the Department of Health, “DOH”). The NHIA, as
the government agency in charge of the national insurance
program, has collected, processed and retained all insurance
and medical information on the insured persons and service
providers (hereinafter, “Health Insurance Data”) in the course
of handling the health insurance affairs.20
The Health Insurance Data were not only utilized by the
NHIA in providing healthcare services but were also applied by
third parties entrusted by the NHIA to conduct academic
research. Since 1998, the NHIA has annually sent the Health
Insurance Data to the National Health Research Institutes
(“NHRI”), a state-sponsored private research institution.21 As
part of the NHRI’s research work, a centralized health data
center, the National Health Insurance Research Database
(“NHIRD”), 22 was created. The information stored in the
Welfare,
National
Health
Insurance
Program
overview,
http://www.nhi.gov.tw/English/webdata/webdata.aspx?menu=11&menu_id=5
90&webdata_id=3189&WD_ID=590 (last visited May 5, 2016).
19 National Health Insurance Administration, Ministry of Health and
Welfare, Executive Yuan, 2015-2016 National Health Insurance Annual
Report,
San-Kuei
Huang,
at
4
(2015),
http://www.nhi.gov.tw/epaper/ItemDetail.aspx?DataID=4030&IsWebData=0
&ItemTypeID=3&PapersID=359&PicID=.
pdf (last visited May 5, 2016) (As of 2015, it has been two decades since the
NHI program was launched in 1995; the enrollment rate has reached
99.9969%, and 93% of hospitals and services providers have join the NHI
program.).
20 NATIONAL HEALTH INSURANCE ADMINISTRATION MINISTRY OF HEALTH
AND WELFARE, NHIA overview, http://www.nhi.gov.tw/english/index.aspx?
menu=8& menu_id=30 (last visited Mar. 10, 2016).
21
NATIONAL
HEALTH
RESEARCH
INSTITUTES,
Overview,
http://english.nhri.org.tw/NHRI_WEB/nhriw001Action.do (last visited May 5,
2016) (“The National Health Research Institutes (NHRI) is a non-profit
foundation established by the government with its organization charter
created by an Act of Congress (Legislative Yuan) and signed in 1995 by
President Teng-hui Lee. Being an autonomous research organization under
the supervision of the Department of Health, Executive Yuan, the NHRI is
dedicated to the enhancement of medical research and the improvement of
health care in this country.”).
22 Cáituán fǎrén guójiā wèishēng yán jiù yuàn shèzhì tiáolì (財團法人國
家衛生研究院設置條例) [National Health Research Institutes Establishment
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NHIRD has been opened since 2000 to allow access on a perapplication basis by researchers and scientists who need to
conduct medical-related research.23
In a continued effort to improve healthcare services and to
aid the reform of public health policies, the Executive Yuan
initiated a National Health Informatics Project (“NHIP”)24 and
established within the MHW the Collaboration Center of
Health Information Application (“CCHIA”) on May 3, 2009.25
Since its operation on February 1, 2011, the CCHIA has served
as a national database wherein other government agencies may
access the Health Insurance Data through the CCHIA. The
CCHIA data may be combined with other personal data, such
as household registration and tax returns, to enable the
government’s collaborative use of personal data, as the MHW
expected when creating the CCHIA.26
It was the goal of the CCHIA that the open and free flow of
Health Insurance Data accessible to the government agencies
and academic researchers would provide analysis and research
results based on these personal data, and that would be helpful
for the government to provide improved health care services to
citizens. In sending the Health Insurance Data to the CCHIA
database, the NHIA has vowed to protect individuals’ data
privacy.27 Among the data privacy and security measures that
the NHIA has undertaken, the NHIA has declared that all
Health Insurance Data are scrambled and de-identified before
being released to the CCHIA to ensure that individual

Act], art. 1, FǍ YUÁN FǍLǛ WǍNG ( 法 源 法 律 網 ) [LAWBANK], Feb. 3, 1999
(Taiwan), http://db.lawbank.com.tw/ENG/FLAW/FLAWDAT01.asp?
lsid=FL013285.
23 Tsai v. NHIA, 2014 FǍ YUÁN FǍLǛ WǍNG (法源法律網) [LAWBANK], No.
102-Su-36, at reasoning ¶ v. (Taipei High Admin. Ct. May 14, 2014) (Taiwan).
24 Press Release, National Development Council, CEPD Press Release
Historical data area (2001- 2014/1/21); Health Informatics Project overview,

http://www.ndc.gov.tw/News_Content.aspx?n=C90548F2DB23E8
B9&sms=AB593F5AE64A02BE&s=CBC61A22871DB59F (Apr.

23, 2007).
25 MINISTRY OF HEALTH AND WELFARE, Collaboration Center of Health
Information Application CCHIA Application overview, http://www.mohw
.gov.tw/cht/DOS/DM1.aspx?f_list_no=812 (last visited Mar. 10, 2016).
26 Id.
27 Id.
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identification is not traceable.28
Eight individuals filed separate petitions to the NHIA in
May and June of 2012 claiming that the NHIA should not
transfer their personal data to any third parties for purposes
not related to health insurance affairs.29 The petitioners were
denied by the NHIA and initiated a joint administrative
lawsuit with the Taiwan High Administrative Court against
the NHIA, requesting that a restraining order be issued to
prohibit the NHIA from disclosing their personal health data
without their consent.30
B. Plaintiffs’ Allegation
The subjects of the data alleged that the NHIA’s
unauthorized transfer or disclosure of their personal data to
third parties exceeded the scope of consent they originally gave
when agreeing that the NHIA could collect their personal data.
The plaintiffs alleged that the NHIA failed to obtain their
consent when reusing the data for other purposes not indicated
or agreed upon by the data subjects. According to the theneffective privacy protection law in Taiwan (i.e., the ComputerProcessed Personal Data Protection Act, “CPDPA”), if the data
controller wishes to use personal data in a manner inconsistent
with the purposes stated when the data were collected, this
manner of secondary use is not permissible unless it is
necessary for the government agency to perform its duties or
the situation qualifies for any statutory exemptions. 31 The
provision of personal data by NHIA to others, as the plaintiffs
alleged, does not fall under the statutory functions of the
NHIA, which are limited to policy making, administration and
supervision of public health affairs.32 In other words, the data
were not properly used within the necessary scope of the
specific purposes of data collection.
The plaintiffs added that even if the NHIA’s duty is
Tsai, No. 102-Su-36, at reasoning ¶ v.
Id. at reasoning ¶¶ i, ii.
30 Id.
31 Computer-Processed Personal Data Protection Law Act [CPDPA], art.
8 (1995) (Taiwan) http://twse-regulation.twse.com.tw/EN/law/DAT06.aspx?
FLCODE=FL010627&FLDATE=19950811&LSER=001.
32 Tsai, No. 102-Su-36, at reasoning ¶ iii. (May 14, 2014).
28
29
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broadly defined to justify the provision of personal health data
to others for research purposes, the personal data submitted by
the NHIA to NHIRD and CCHIA were not properly encrypted,
leading to a possible breach of privacy by disclosing the
subjects’ personal identities.33 The data the NHIA submitted
were allegedly loosely protected and may have been traceable
to individuals’ personal identity, and the disclosure of their
personal information created significant concerns about privacy
invasion.34 It was further argued by the plaintiffs that even if
the NHIA had the authority to transfer the Health Insurance
Data to the NHIRD and CCHIA without the individuals’
consent, the subjects of the data should be entitled to demand
that the NHIA stop using their personal data, which is part of
their privacy rights as granted in the Taiwan Personal Data
Protection Act.35
C. The NHIA’s Defenses
The NHIA argued that its use of the plaintiffs’ personal
data was within its statutory duty and was in compliance with
the specific purposes. The NHIA argued that it has met one of
the exemption to reuse personal data for purposes outside the
scope of the purposes of data collection as stipulated in the
CPDPA, which permits data reuse when “it is necessary for the
purpose of academic research and would not cause significant
harm to data subjects.”36
In response to the plaintiffs’ claim that individuals own the
right to full control over their personal information both
“before” and “after” the data misuse, and therefore are entitled
to stop the NHIA from reusing the data, the NHIA argued that
the privacy laws do not support the plaintiffs’ positions. The
NHIA explained that since the law has permitted the NHIA to
reuse personal data for specified purposes outside the scope of
the purpose of data collection, this means that the law has
restricted the data subjects’ right to control their personal data

33
34
35
36

Id.
Id.
Id. at reasoning ¶ iii.
CPDPA, supra note 31, at art. 8, ¶ 7.
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both before and after the NHIA’s reuse of their personal data. 37
The plaintiffs’ allegation that they have the right to raise
objections to stop the NHIA from using their personal
information runs afoul to the purpose of allowing the NHIA to
use personal data in the public interest. The NHIA alleged
that if the law permits the NHIA’s use of personal data without
obtaining consent from the data subjects, then it is equal to
permission for the NHIA to use such data without intervention
from the data subjects, meaning that that the data controller’s
right to use personal data prevails over the interest of the
individuals in refusing such use of data.38
Additionally, the NHRI, which assisted the NHIA in the
lawsuit, claimed that all the data provided by the NHIA was
encrypted, so that the NHRI could not identify specific
individuals; therefore, the data transfer by the NHIA to the
NHRI is not subject to the PDPA.39
D. Court Judgment
The Taipei High Administrative Court (“High Court”)
dismissed the plaintiffs’ lawsuit on May 14, 2014. 40 The
plaintiffs filed an appeal, and the Supreme Administrative
Court (“Supreme Court”) remanded the case to the High Court
for re-trial on November 13, 2014. 41
The Supreme
Administrative Court vacated the High Court’s judgment on
the grounds that the pertinent case should be governed by the
“PDPA” 42 rather than its precedent, the CPDPA (which was
renamed and amended the Taiwan PDPA on May 26, 2000).43
The Supreme Court ruled that the High Court should reexamine the issues by applying the correct law.44 Because the
Supreme Court vacated the High Court’s judgment on the
Tsai, No. 102-Su-36, at reasoning ¶ iv. (May 14, 2014).
Tsai, No. 102-Su-36, at reasoning ¶ iv.
39 Id. at reasoning ¶ v.
40 Id. at holding.
41 Tsai v. NHIA, 2014 FǍ YUÁN FǍLǛ WǍNG (法源法律網) [LAWBANK], No.
103-Pan-600 at holding (Sup. Admin. Ct. Nov. 13, 2014) [hereinafter Tsai,
No. 103-Pan-600].
42 PDPA, supra note 17.
43 Tsai, No. 103-Pan-600, at reasoning ¶ viii.
44 Id.
37
38
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grounds of incorrect application of the law without addressing
the merits of the dispute over privacy invasion, this article will
focus on the reasoning of the High Court’s judgment in
examining the relevant privacy issues.
The High Court’s judgment can be summarized as follows.
1. Controversy over the Application of Old and New
Privacy Laws
This dispute occurred at a time when the Taiwan privacy
law was undergoing a major amendment. The primary issue of
the dispute lies in the determination of which data protection
law should apply in relation to the NHIA’s transfer of Health
Insurance Data to the NHRI and CCHIA. Taiwan adopted its
first personal data protection law, the CPDPA, in 1995 (“Old
Privacy Law”), the same year the European Union (“EU”)
adopted the Data Protection Directive.45 After more than ten
years, the Old Privacy Law underwent an overhaul to provide
comprehensive data protection to respond to new privacy
threats in the wake of a rapidly evolving technology changes.
It was amended and renamed the PDPA on May 26, 2010
(“New Privacy Law”). The New Privacy Law became effective
on October 1, 2012.
Under the New Privacy Law, sensitive personal data (i.e.,
personal data relating to medical treatments, genetic
information, sex life, health checks and criminal records) are
subject to stricter requirements in terms of how such data can
be processed and transferred. 46 The Health Insurance Data
that the plaintiffs are addressing falls under the scope of the
defined sensitive personal data under the New Privacy Law.
However, the provisions relating to sensitive personal data are
not yet effective due to controversy over the difficulty of
implementing such provisions.
The High Court’s
interpretation of the application of the old and new privacy
laws is that the NHIA is not subject to the New Privacy Law in
45 Parliament and Council Directive 95/46/EC, On the Protection of
Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free
Movement
of
Such
Data,
1995
O.J.
(L
281)
31,
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/docs/95-46-ce/dir199546_part1_en.pdf [hereinafter EU Data Protection Directive].
46 PDPA, supra note 17, at art. 6.
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terms of its handling of the Health Insurance Data, because
the privacy provisions relating to sensitive data was not yet
effective as of the date of the trial and the Health Insurance
Data was not specifically regulated under the New Privacy
Law.
Although the New Privacy Law has set certain
requirements for the NHIA’s compliance in the process of
collecting and using personal data, 47 such requirements are
only applicable when non-sensitive personal data is involved.
The High Court therefore concluded, despite the fact that the
pertinent dispute occurred after the implementation of the New
Privacy Law, that whether the Health Insurance Data can be
legally used by the NHIA shall be subject to the Old Privacy
Law, which does not distinguish general personal data from
sensitive personal data. As a result, the High Court ruled that
the NHIA’s collection and use of the Health Insurance Data
should be subject to Articles 7 and 8 of the Old Privacy Law,
whereas the legislative reasons of Articles 15 and 16 of the
New Privacy Law may be taken into consideration as a
reference.48
The Supreme Court disagreed with the High
Administration Court’s interpretation of the law and ruled that
although the provisions relating to sensitive personal data
were pending implementation, issues involving sensitive
personal data should be regulated as non-sensitive data and
should still be subject to the New Privacy Law. In other words,
although there is no special law or regulation applicable to
sensitive personal data, the New Privacy Law applies to
sensitive personal data and non-sensitive data in the same
manner.49
2. The NHIA’s forwarding of the Health Insurance Data to
the NHRI and CCHIA is Necessary for the NHIA to Exercise
Its Statutory Duty
When reviewing the issues regarding whether the NHIA
may resort to its statutory duty to justify its provision of the
Health Insurance Data to third parties for research purposes,
47
48
49

Id. at art. 15, 16.
Tsai, No. 102-Su-36, at reasoning ¶ vii.
Tsai, No. 103-Pan-600, at reasoning ¶ viii.
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the High Court gave a positive answer. In the court’s findings,
the Organization Act of the National Health Insurance
Administration, Ministry of Health and Welfare (Organization
Act of NHIA) stipulated in Article 1,50 and in Paragraphs 5 and
8 of Article 2,51 that the NHIA is in charge of the planning and
implementation of policies relating to the national health
insurance program and the enhancement of the quality of the
nation’s healthcare services and all related matters. The High
Court ruled that because the NHIA is responsible for all
matters relating to the national health insurance program,
which should reasonably include regular review and evaluation
of the implementation results through academic research to
facilitate improvement of the healthcare services offered in the
national health insurance program, it should be within the
scope of the NHIA’s duty to provide the Health Insurance Data
to the NHRI and CCHIA for research purposes.52
3. The NHIA’s Disclosure of Health Insurance Data
Qualifies for the Exemptions in the Use of Personal Data for
Specific Purposes Other than the Notified Purposes of
Collection
The High Court ruled that the pertinent dispute should be
determined pursuant to the Old Privacy Law because the New
Privacy Law is silent with regard to the collection and
processing of sensitive personal data.
However, it also
considered the relevant provisions in the New Privacy Law in
rendering the judgment because the latter has offered stronger
privacy protection to individuals. The Court explained that
50 Wèishēng fúlì bù zhōngyāng jiànkāng bǎoxiǎn shǔ zǔzhī fǎ (衛生福利部
中央健康保險署組織法) [Organization Act of the National Health Insurance
Administration, Ministry of Health and Welfare] art. 1, FǍ YUÁN FǍLǛ WǍNG (
法 源 法 律 網 )
[LAWBANK],
Dec.
28,
1994
(Taiwan),
http://db.lawbank.com.tw/Eng/FLAW/FLAWDAT01.asp?lsid=FL013281
(Article 1 of Organization Act of NHIA “For the purpose of administering the
National Health Insurance affairs, the Ministry of Health and Welfare has
established the National Health Insurance Administration.”).
51 Id. at art. 2, ¶ 5, 8 (“NHIA shall be in charge of the following matters:
. . . 5. The formulation, planning and implementation of the review of medical
services provided by the National Health Insurance and enhancement of
medical quality. . . 8. Any other matter in relation to the National Health
Insurance.”).
52 Tsai v., No. 102-Su-36, at reasoning ¶ vii.
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Article 8 of the Old Privacy Law provides that government
agencies may only use personal data for purposes within their
exercise of duties and should comply with the purposes of data
collection except for the numerated exemptions.53 One of the
exemptions is that data controllers may use collected data for
other purposes if it is necessary for the purpose of academic
research and that the use of personal data will not cause
significant harm to the data subject. 54 A similar but more
stringent requirement for data use is set forth in the New
Privacy Law. Item 5 of Article 16 of the New Privacy Law
provides that government agencies shall not use personal data
collected for other purposes unless “it is necessary for
government agency or research institution to use data for
public interest on statistics or the purpose of academic
research, and such use of data will not lead to the identification
of a certain person after the treatment of the provider or by the
disclosure of the collector.” 55 When comparing the relevant
data processing requirements in the Old Privacy Law and New
Privacy Law, the Court first concluded that the latter has
offered stronger protection and should apply to this dispute to
fulfill the data protection requirement as declared by the
Constitutional Court in its Decision No. 603, wherein the right
to information privacy is officially recognized.56
In reviewing whether the NHIA’s disclosure of Health
Insurance Data to the NHRI and CCHIA to establish the
national health data center satisfied the data use requirements
in both the Old and New Privacy Laws, the Court determined
that this data transfer was permissible because it was
conducted for academic research in the public interest. 57
Moreover, the data involved was properly de-identified and
should not harm the interests of the data subjects.58 Although
it is true that the Health Insurance Data were not used by the
NHIA for purposes directly related to the provision of national
health care services, the Court took into account the academic
53
54
55
56
57
58

CPDPA, supra note 31, at art. 8.
Id. at art. 8(7).
PDPA, supra note 17, at 16(5).
Tsai, No. 102-Su-36, at ¶ vii v.
Id.
Id.
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research purpose behind the data use with the aim of
improving medical services. The Court also noted that the data
transferred to the NHRI and CCHIA were de-identified to
avoid identification of specific individuals to protect the privacy
of the data subjects. Therefore, the Court concluded that the
NHIA should have satisfied the requirement of Item 7 of
Article 8 of the Old Privacy Law that it is necessary for the
purpose of academic research and that the use of personal data
will not cause significant harm to the data subject and does not
run afoul of Item 5 of Article 6 of the New Privacy Law.59
4. The Right to Consent Prior to Data Use and the Right to
Object after Data Use
With regard to the plaintiffs’ claim that the right to
information privacy encompasses the right to consent prior to
use and the right to object after use, the High Court ruled that
the two alleged rights bear the same nature and should be
interpreted using the same rationale. The High Court found
that since both the Old and New Privacy Laws permitted data
use by controllers for specified purposes other than those for
which the data subjects expressed consent when allowing
controllers to collect their data, it is tantamount to a statutory
restriction upon the rights of the data subjects in preventing
their personal data from unauthorized use. The same rule also
applies when the data subject wishes to exercise his right to
ask the data controller to delete or remove any unwanted
disclosure of personal data. If the NHIA has a legal ground in
sending Health Insurance Data to the NHRI and CCHIA for
research purposes, there is no reason to allow the data subjects
to exercise their right to demand that the NHIA stop using
their personal data. Otherwise, the statutory exemptions to
allow government agencies to use personal data to serve the
public interest would be in vain and would lead to the incorrect
interpretation that the right to information privacy is an
absolute right, which is not the intended goal of privacy laws.60
Given this context, if the NHIA is permitted to use the data for
purposes not identified at the time of collection when the public
59
60

Tsai, No. 102-Su-36, at ¶ vii.
Id.
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interest is involved, the plaintiffs shall have no legal standing
to stop the NHIA from using the data.61
III. The Legal Landscape of Privacy Laws with Respect to
Personal Health Data
A. How Health Data is regulated in the Taiwan Personal
Data Protection Act
There are two types of laws in Taiwan that regulate the
collection, processing and use of health information. The first
type of law specially addresses human body research and
personal biological information, including the Human Subjects
Research Act,62 the Human Biobank Management Act63 and the
Medical Care Act. 64 The other type of privacy law provides
general rules for health data protection, mainly the PDPA.65
Tsai does not involve biological information and does not relate
to human body research, so the following discussion will only
cover the PDPA.
1. Definition of Personal Data in the PDPA
The PDPA should encompass activities involving the
processing of personal data as broadly as possible. Personal
data in the PDPA is defined broadly to encompass any type of
information that can be used to directly or indirectly identify or
make possible the identification of a natural person. Therefore,
Item 1, Article 2 of the PDPA defines personal information as
[T]he name, date of birth, I.D. Card number, passport number,
characteristics, fingerprints, marital status, family, education,
occupation, medical record, medical treatment, genetic
Id.
Réntǐ yán jiù fǎ (人體研究法) [Human Subjects Research Act], FǍ
YUÁN FǍLǛ WǍNG ( 法 源 法 律 網 ) [LAWBANK], Dec. 28, 2011 (Taiwan),
http://db.lawbank.com.tw/ENG/FLAW/FLAWDAT01.asp?lsid=FL063770.
63
Réntǐ shēngwù zīliào kù guǎnlǐ tiáolì ( 人 體 生 物 資 料 庫 管 理 條 例 )
Human Biobank Management Act, 2012, FǍ YUÁN FǍLǛ WǍNG (法源法律網)
[LAWBANK], http://db.lawbank.com.tw/ENG/FLAW/FLAWDAT01.asp?lsid=FL
052186.
64 Medical Care Act, 2014, FǍ YUÁN FǍLǛ WǍNG (法源法律網) [LAWBANK],
http://db.lawbank.com.tw/ENG/FLAW/FLAWDAT01.asp?lsid=FL013534.
65 PDPA, supra note 17.
61

62
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information, sexual life, health checks, criminal records, contact
information, financial conditions, social activities and/or other
information which may directly or indirectly be used to identify a
living natural person.66

The PDPA regulations entitled the “Enforcement Rules of
the Personal Information Protection Act” stipulated in Article 3
determine what it means to identify a person indirectly:
“‘Other information which may be used to identify a natural
person indirectly’ . . . shall mean that the government agency
or the non-government agency possessing the information can
not directly identify the specific person without comparing to,
combining with or connecting to other information.”67
In summary, the PDPA only protects personal information
that may be used to identify a natural person directly or
indirectly and does not cover other information that cannot
identify a natural person.
2. The Rights of Individuals in the PDPA
a. Informed Consent
The PDPA requires written consent from data subjects
whose personal data are collected, processed or used, with a
few exceptions. 68 Before providing written consent, the data
subject must be provided with adequate notice before the entity
first collects personal data. 69 The PDPA further stipulates
informed consent as follows.
Article 8 of the PDPA provides that, unless the law has
otherwise exempted, the data collector shall inform the data
subject of the following when collecting personal information:
1. The name of the government agency or the non-government
agency; 2. Purpose of collection; 3. Classification of the personal
information; 4. Time period, area, target and way of the use of
personal information; 5. Rights of the Party and ways to exercise
Id. at art. 2.
Gèrén zīliào bǎohù fǎ shīxíng xìzé ( 個 人 資 料 保 護 法 施 行 細 則 )
[Enforcement Rules of the Personal Information Protection Act], art. 3, FǍ
YUÁN FǍLǛ WǍNG (法源法律網) [LAWBANK], Sep. 26, 2012 (Taiwan),
http://db.lawbank.com.tw/Eng/FLAW/FLAWDAT01.asp?lsid=FL010628.
68 PDPA, supra note 17, at art. 15-16, 19-20.
69 Id. at art. 8.
66

67
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them as prescribed in Article 3; 6. The influence on his rights and
interests while the Party chooses not to provide his personal
information;70

Article 9 of the PDPA provides that data collectors who do
not obtain personal information directly from the data subject
shall inform the data subjects of the source of their personal data
and the information contained in Item 1 to Item 5 of Paragraph of the
preceding Article, before it processes or uses such data.71

b. Right to Access Personally Identifiable Information (PII)
Article 10 of the PDPA provides that upon the request of
the Party, the government agency or non-government agency
should reply to the inquiry, offer a review or provide
duplication of the personal information collected, with the
exception of the following: (1) when national security,
diplomatic and military secrets, macro-economic interests or
other major national interests may be harmed; (2) when the
performance of official duties may be interfered with; and (3)
when the major interests of the collecting agency or a third
person may be affected.72
c. Right to Amend
The data subject has the right to request that the data
controller keep personal data accurate and delete or stop using
the personal data when the originally intended purpose no
longer exists, unless the laws state otherwise or the data
subject has given written consent.73
3. The PDPA Restrictions on Reusing Personal Data
As stipulated in Paragraph 1, Article 6 of the PDPA, it is
prohibited to collect, process or use personal data that is
related to medical, genetic, sexual life, physical check results
and criminal records, unless any of the following conditions are
met:
70
71
72
73

PDPA, supra note 17, at art. 8, ¶ 1.
Id. at art. 9.
Id. at art. 10.
PDPA, supra note 17, at art. 11.
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(1) When in accordance with law; (2) when it is necessary for the
government agency to perform its duties or for the nongovernment agency to fulfill the legal obligation, and when there
are proper security measures; (3) when the party has disclosed
such information by himself, or when the information concerned
has been publicized legally; or (4) when the personal information
is collected, processed or used under certain methods by a
government agency or an academic research institution based on
the purpose of medical treatment, personal hygiene or crime
prevention, statistics and/or study. 74

The most relevant clause applicable to Tsai is the last
item, wherein the data controller may collect, process or use
personal health data for purposes of medical, hygiene, statistics
or academic research without obtaining consent from the data
subjects.
This article authorized the relevant competent
authorities to consult with the Ministry of Justice to write the
implementing rules with respect to the scope process and
relevant compliance procedures.
As of this date, the
implementation rules have not yet been drafted.
When the PDPA was promulgated on May 26, 2010 and
became effective since October 1, 2012, the legislator stated
that the provision related to health information (i.e., the abovementioned Article 6 of the PDPA) would be implemented on a
date to be decided by the Executive Yuan. As of this date, this
article is not yet effective. Due to this fact, when the Taipei
High Administrative Court was asked to try Tsai, the court
could not apply Article 6 of the PDPA. Instead, the Court
decided to apply the predecessor of the PDPA, the abolished
CPDPA.75
The Court seems to have misunderstood the legislative
intent of enacting Article 6 of the PDPA. As expressly stated in
the legislative explanation, this article was drafted because
certain types of personal data are of a sensitive nature and are
subject to a higher risk of privacy harm to an individual if
these data are improperly collected, processed or used. The
legislator took into account the EU Directive 95/46/EC76 and
wrote Article 6 of the PDPA to provide a higher degree of
74
75
76

Id. at art. 6, ¶ 1.
CPDPA, supra note 31; Tsai, No. 102-Su-36, at ¶ vii..
EU Data Protection Directive, supra note 44.
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protection and stricter standards for data collection, processing
and use for five types of personal data: medical, genetic, sexual
life, physical check results and criminal records.77 The PDPA
intentionally affords two distinct levels of protection and rules
for general personal data (or non-sensitive personal data) and
sensitive personal data. The general rule is applicable to
general personal data and the enhanced protection is only
applicable to sensitive data. Article 6 of the PDPA is such an
enhanced protection rule. Accordingly, even though Article 6 of
the PDPA is not yet effective and no enhanced protection is
available for sensitive data at this time, there is no reason why
sensitive data are not protected by the other clauses of the
PDPA that offer general privacy protection. Fortunately, the
appeal court rectified the incorrect interpretation of the PDPA
that the court adopted and recognized that sensitive data
should be subject to the PDPA, not the CPDPA.78
The privacy rule applicable to non-sensitive data in the
case in which public agencies wish to collect and process
personal data is provided in Article 15 of the PDPA:
Except the information stated in Paragraph 1 of Article 6, the
government agency should not collect or process personal
information unless there is a specific purpose and should comply
with one of the following conditions: 1. it is within the scope of job
functions provided by laws and regulations; 2. a written consent
has been made by the Party; and 3. the rights and interests of the
Party may not be harmed.79

For public agencies to use health information, Article 16 of
the PDPA provides the following:
Except the information stated in Paragraph 1 of Article 6, the
government agency should use the personal information in
accordance with the scope of its job functions provided by laws
and regulations, and in compliance with the specific purpose of
collection. 80 However, the information may be used outside the
scope upon the occurrence of one of the following conditions: 1.
Where in accordance with law; 2. Where it is for national security
or to promote public interests; 3. Where it is to prevent harm on
77
78
79
80

PDPA, supra note 17, at art. 6 (“legislative intent”).
See Tsai, No. 102-Su-36, at reasoning ¶ viii.
PDPA, supra note 17, at art. 15.
Id.
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the life, body, freedom or property of the Party; 4. Where it is to
prevent harm on the rights and interests of other people; 5.
Where it is necessary for public interests on statistical analysis,
or the purpose of academic research conducted by a government
agency or an academic research institution, respectively. The
information may not lead to the identification of a certain person
after the treatment of the provider or the disclosure of the
collector; 6. Where such use may benefit the Party; and 7. A
written consent of the Party has been obtained. 81

For a non-government agency to collect or process health
information, Paragraph I, Article 19 of the PDPA provides that:
Except the information stated in Paragraph 1 of Article 6, the
non-government agency should not collect or process personal
information unless there is a specific purpose and should comply
with one of the following conditions: 1. Where in accordance with
law; 2. Where there is a contract or quasi-contract between the
Party and the agency; 3. Where the Party has disclosed such
information by himself or when the information has been
publicized legally; 4. Where it is necessary for public interests on
statistical analysis, or the purpose of academic research
conducted by a research institution. The information may not
lead to the identification of a certain person after the treatment
of the provider or the disclosure of the collector; 5. Where a
written consent has been made by the Party; 6. Where the public
interest is involved; and 7. Where the personal information is
obtained from publicly available resources. 82 However, it is
exempted if the information is limited by the Party on the
processing or use and the interests of the Party should be
protected.83

For a non-government agency to use medical information,
Paragraph 1 of Article 20 of the PDPA provides that
Personal data may be used only for the purposes for which it has
been collected subject to the following exceptions where: 1. it is in
accordance with law; 2. it is to promote the public interest; 3. it is
to prevent harm to the data subject’s life, body, freedom or
property; 4. it is to prevent harm to other persons’ vital rights
and interests; 5. it is necessary for a government agency or a
research institution to conduct statistical data analysis or
81
82
83

Id.
Id. at art. 19.
Id. at art. 19.
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academic research, provided that the data, after been processed
by data provider or disclosed by data collector, can no longer
connect with a person’s identity; and 6. written consent has been
given by the data subject.84

In Tsai, the disputed issue is whether the defendant
NHIA, as a government agency, may collect, process and use
the plaintiffs’ health data that record their visits to the hospital
for certain diseases and the diagnoses and treatments provided
by hospitals. These data were collected by the NHIA in the
course of providing national health insurance services. Based
on these facts, the applicable laws would be Articles 15 and 16
of the PDPA. The plaintiffs did not contest that the NHIA was
authorized to collect their health data; therefore, there was no
dispute regarding the application of Article 15. What the
plaintiffs alleged was that the NHIA did not obtain their
consent to transfer their health data to the NHRI and CCHIA
and that such data reuse violated the PDPA, particularly
Article 16 of the PDPA.
Article 16 of the PDPA is a reflection of the use limitation
principle: government agencies can only use personal data for
the same purposes for which they collected that data.
Considering the occasions on which personal data may be
reasonably used for other purposes, the same article
enumerates seven exceptions in which government agencies
may use personal data for other purposes. In Tsai, the NHIA
provided health data that were processed in a manner that
would de-identify the persons to the NHRI and CCHIA to
establish a national health data center for academic research
and for government agencies to access. The transfer of
personal health data by the NHIA went beyond the original
purposes when such health data were provided by the data
subjects to the NHIA. The NHIA must prove that it has
qualified for any of the numerated statutory exemptions to
make the data transfer legitimate.
The most relevant
exception to which the NHIA may appeal would be Item 5,
Article 16 of the PDPA, which stipulates that “where it is
necessary for government agencies or academic research
institutions to pursue public interest, for statistical analysis, or
Id. at art. 20. (the quoted language is a translation from Taiwanese to
English by the author).
84
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for academic research, and such data have been processed in a
manner that the data cannot identify a certain person, or the
manner of disclosure cannot identify a certain person.”85
To qualify for this exception to reuse personal data, the
government agency has to substantiate that the contemplated
data reuse is necessary for it to perform its statutory
authorization, and it must qualify in three aspects: (1) the
entity that reuses the personal data must be either a
government agency or an academic research institution; (2) the
purpose for the reuse of personal data is necessary to pursue
the public interest, statistical analysis or academic research;
and (3) the data have been processed to the extent that the
data cannot identify a specific person.86
In Tsai, the entities that used the plaintiffs’ health data
included the NHIA, NHRI and CCHIA, which are government
agencies and branches within the MHW. The NHRI was
entrusted by the NHIA to construct and operate the national
health data center; the NHRI is regarded as an extension of the
NHIA. Furthermore, the NHIRD was established for medical
research purposes to improve medicine and hygiene services.
The plaintiffs seem unable to contest the fact that the NHIA
met the first two requirements for the exceptional reuse of
heath data. Most of the debates in Tsai involved whether the
heath data at issue were processed to the extent that the data
could not identify a specific person. The Court ruled in favor of
the NHIA that the data were duly encrypted and could not be
linked to a specific individual.87
The NHIA added that it has made additional efforts to
ensure the personal data are safely stored in the NHIRD and
any access to the database is strictly regulated. The NHIA,
with the authority granted by the PDPA, amended in 1998 the
Rules for Applications to Access the National Health Insurance
Research Database, 88 which was renamed the Rules for

Id. at art. 16, cl. 5.
Id.
87 Tsai, No. 102-Su-36, at reasoning ¶ vii.
88 Quánmín jiànkāng bǎoxiǎn yánjiū zīliào kù – jiā zhí fúwù shēnqǐng
yuánzé ( 全民 健 康保 險研 究資 料 庫 – 加值 服 務申 請原則 ) [National Health
Insurance Research Database – Rules for Applications to Access] (2003),
http://nhird.nhri.org.tw/rule_02.html. (last visited Mar. 21, 2016).
85
86
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Applications to Access the National Health Insurance Research
Database Value-Added Service, 89 which the NHRI needed to
comply with in reviewing the application to access the health
information database. Pursuant to Section 3 of the Application
Rule, applications to obtain “value-added health insurance
data” are equivalent to human body research, and applicants
should submit their proposals to the Research Ethic Boards
and obtain the boards’ approval before conducing the research
pursuant to the Human Subjects Research Act.90
B. Regulations of the U.S. HIPAA and HITEC for the
Disclosure or Use of Personal Health Data for Research
Purposes
In 1996, the U.S. Congress enacted the Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) 91 to
“improve [the] portability and continuity of health insurance
coverage in the group and individual markets, to combat waste,
fraud, and abuse in health insurance and health care delivery,
to promote the use of medical savings accounts, to improve
access to long-term care services and coverage, to simplify the
administration of health insurance, and for other purposes.”92
The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS),
with the authority granted by HIPAA, 93 published the
Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health
Information in December 2000 (often referred to as the “HIPAA
Privacy Rules”) 94 and modified some of the rules in August
Id.
Id.
91 Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 29 U.S.C., 42 U.S.C. and 18 U.S.C.).
92 Id. at preamble.
93 SOLOVE & SCHWARTZ, supra note 3, at 431-32 (“Congress did not
legislate privacy rules within HIPAA itself. Rather, congress established a
deadline of August 21, 1999, for it to return to this topic and enact
comprehensive legislation to provide for privacy of medical information. The
Act also provided that if Congress failed to act by that date, then the
Department of Health and Human Services was to promulgate regulations
with regard to health privacy.”).
94 Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information;
Final Rule, 65 Fed. Reg. 82, 462 (Dec. 28, 2000) (codified at 45 C.F.R. §§ 160,
164).
89
90
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2002. 95 The HIPAA Privacy Rules are considered the first
comprehensive federal regulations to provide a minimum level
of protection for all states on health information privacy.96
In 2009, the U.S. Congress passed the American Recovery
and Reinvestment Act of 2009, which includes the Health
Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health
(HITECH) Act.97 The HITECH Act was designed to “create a
national standard of safeguards to protect the confidentiality,
integrity, and availability of electronic [protected health
information].” 98 In January 2013, the HHS issued the
“Security, Enforcement, and Breach Notification Rules Under
the Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical
Health Act and the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination
Act; Other Modifications to the HIPAA Rules”99 (often referred
to as the “HIPAA Omnibus Rule”) to strengthen data privacy
and data security protection for individuals’ health
information. The HIPAA Omnibus Rule implemented changes
to HITECH and the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination
Act of 2008 (“GINA”). 100 The most significant amendments
strengthened the protection of information privacy in the
Breach Notification Rule101 and expanded the scope of parties
that are subject to the HIPAA Privacy Rules. In the amended
HIPAA Omnibus Rule, business associates102 as well as their
95 Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information,
67 Fed. Reg. 14, 776 (proposed Mar. 27, 2002) (codified at 45 C.F.R. §§ 160,
164).
96 See SOLOVE & SCHWARTZ, supra note 3, at 432.
97 Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115, 226-79 (2009).
98 Kevin Twidwell & Brianne McClafferty, New HIPAA Rules Go into
Effect: Lawyers Need to up Their Game in Protecting Private Health Care
Information, 39 MONT. LAW. 14, 14 (2014).
99 Modifications to the HIPAA Privacy, Security, Enforcement, and
Breach Notification Rules Under the Health Information Technology for
Economic and Clinical Health Act and the Genetic Information
Nondiscrimination Act; Other Modifications to the HIPAA Rules, 78 Fed.
Reg. 5566 (Jan. 25, 2013) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. §§ 160, 164).
100 See Darci Bentson, HIPAA, HITECH and the 2013 Omnibus Changes,
39 Mont. Law. 5, at 5, n. 1 (2014).
101 See Twidwell & McClafferty, supra note 98, at 16.
102 Bentson, supra note 100, at 6 (“Prior to the 2013 Omnibus Rule,
Business Associates were held responsible for maintaining the privacy of
protected health information via contractual arrangements that were
required of Covered Entities prior to disclosing or providing access to PHI to
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subcontractors103 were covered by the rule.
1. The HIPAA Privacy Rule Basics
To apply the HIPAA Privacy Rule, we should first
ascertain who is subject to the rule, what information is
protected by the rule and what rights the data subjects have
with regard to the data controllers.
a. The Covered Entities
The HIPAA Privacy Rule does not apply to all persons who
use or disclose personal health data; it only applies to “covered
entities.”104 “Covered entities” include the following:105
(1) A health plan, which refers to “an individual or group
plan that provides, or pays the cost of, medical care.”106
(2) A health care clearinghouse:
Health care clearinghouse means a public or private entity,
including a billing service, repricing company, community health
management information system or community health
information system, and “value-added” networks and switches,
that does either of the following functions: (1) Processes or
facilitates the processing of health information received from
another entity in a nonstandard format or containing
nonstandard data content into standard data elements or a
standard transaction. (2) Receives a standard transaction from
another entity and processes or facilitates the processing of
health information into nonstandard format or nonstandard data
content for the receiving entity.107

(3) A health care provider refers to “a provider of services,
a provider of medical or health services, and any other person
that Business Associate. Now, with the Omnibus changes, Business
Associates are directly governed by HIPAA and are subject to many of the
same rules and sanctions as the Covered Entities.”).
103 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2014) (definitions of “Business Associate” and
“subcontractor”).
104 45 C.F.R. § 160.102 (2013).
105 Id.; 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2014) (definition of covered entity).
106 42 U.S.C. § 1320d (2010); 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-91 (2015); Id. (definition
of “health plan”).
107 42 U.S.C. § 1302 (2015); 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (definition of “health
care provider”).
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or organization who furnishes, bills, or is paid for health care in
the normal course of business.”108
In addition to the above covered entities, given that on
many occasions covered entities are not able to complete all
assignments and outsource part of their work, which may
involve personal health information, to other entities, the
business associates that are engaged by the covered entities to
handle personal health data are also subject to HIPAA. A
“business associate” is defined in HIPAA as follows:
Business associate includes: (i) A Health Information
Organization, E-prescribing Gateway, or other person that
provides data transmission services with respect to protected
health information to a covered entity and that requires access
on a routine basis to such protected health information. (ii) A
person that offers a personal health record to one or more
individuals on behalf of a covered entity. (iii) A subcontractor
that creates, receives, maintains, or transmits protected health
information on behalf of the business associate. 109

b. Protected Health Information
Identifiable Health Information

(PHI)—Individually

The HIPAA defines “health information” as follows:
any information, including genetic information, whether oral or
recorded in any form or medium, that: (1) Is created or received
by a health care provider, health plan, public health authority,
employer, life insurer, school or university, or health care
clearinghouse; and (2) Relates to the past, present, or future
physical or mental health or condition of an individual; the
provision of health care to an individual; or the past, present, or
future payment for the provision of health care to an
individual.110

HIPAA is only applicable to PHI. PHI is individually
identifiable health information that includes information (i)
transmitted by electronic media; (ii) maintained in electronic
media; or (iii) transmitted or maintained in any other form or

108
109
110

Id.
45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (definition of “business associate”).
Id. (definition of “health information”).
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medium. 111 HIPAA excludes some individually identifiable
health information that is already regulated in other laws or
regulations: “(i) In education records covered by the Family
Educational Rights and Privacy Act, as amended, 20 U.S.C.
1232 g; (ii) In records described at 20 U.S.C. 1232 g(a)(4)(B)(iv);
(iii) In employment records held by a covered entity in its role
as employer; and (iv) Regarding a person who has been
deceased for more than 50 years.”112
HIPAA further defines individually identifiable health
information as follows:
Individually identifiable health information is information that is
a subset of health information, including demographic
information collected from an individual, and: (1) Is created or
received by a health care provider, health plan, employer, or
health care clearinghouse; and (2) Relates to the past, present, or
future physical or mental health or condition of an individual; the
provision of health care to an individual; or the past, present, or
future payment for the provision of health care to an individual;
and (i) That identifies the individual; or (ii) With respect to which
there is a reasonable basis to believe the information can be used
to identify the individual.113

c. Data Subjects’ Rights
When the scope of covered entities and health information
is ascertained, the next issue is the rights that are afforded to
the data subjects. In HIPAA, the subjects of PHI have the
following rights:
(1) Right to consent to the use or disclosure of PHI: Except
for reasons of treatment, payment, or health care operations,
covered entities should obtain authorization from the data
subjects before they can use or disclose PHI.114 However, in the
following circumstances, the covered entities may use or
disclose PHI without authorization from the data subjects:
(a) Uses and disclosures required by law; (b)Uses and disclosures
for public health activities; (c)Disclosures about victims of abuse,
Id. (definition of “protected health information”).
Id.
113 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (definition of “individually identifiable health
information”).
114 45 C.F.R. § 164.502 (2015).
111
112
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neglect or domestic violence; (d) Uses and disclosures for health
oversight activities; (e) Disclosures for judicial and
administrative proceedings; (f) Disclosures for law enforcement
purposes; (g) Uses and disclosures about decedents; (h) Uses and
disclosures for cadaveric organ, eye or tissue donation purposes;
(i) Uses and disclosures for research purposes; (j) Uses and
disclosures to avert a serious threat to health or safety; (k) Uses
and disclosures for specialized government functions; (l)
Disclosures for workers’ compensation. 115

In the above exceptions where no consent is required from
the data subjects, the most relevant part upon which this
article focuses is the above (i) use and disclosure for research
purposes.
(2) Rights to request privacy protection for PHI: Such
rights include the right of an individual to request restriction of
use and disclosure 116 and the right to require confidential
communication of PHI.117
(3) Right of access to PHI:
An individual has a right of access to inspect and obtain a copy of
protected health information about the individual in a designated
record set, for as long as the protected health information is
maintained in the designated record set, except for: (i)
Psychotherapy notes; (ii) Information compiled in reasonable
anticipation of, or for use in, a civil, criminal, or administrative
action or proceeding; and (iii) Protected health information
maintained by a covered entity that is: (A) Subject to the Clinical
Laboratory Improvements Amendments of 1988, 42 U.S.C. 263a,
to the extent the provision of access to the individual would be
prohibited by law; or (B) Exempt from the Clinical Laboratory
Improvements Amendments of 1988, pursuant to 42 CFR
493.3(a)(2).118

(4) Right to amend: An individual has the right to request
that “a covered entity amend protected health information or a
record about the individual in a designated record set for as
long as the PHI is maintained in the designated record set.”119
(5) Right to an accounting of disclosures of PHI: HIPAA
115
116
117
118
119

45 C.F.R. §
45 C.F.R. §
45 C.F.R. §
45 C.F.R. §
45 C.F.R. §
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164.522(b) (2015).
164.524 (2015).
164.526 (2015).
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grants subjects the right to “receive an accounting of
disclosures of protected health information made by a covered
entity in the six years prior to the date on which the accounting
is requested.”120
2. HIPAA Research Provisions
a. The Definition of Research
HIPAA provides exceptions wherein the data controller
may use personal data without the data subject’s consent if
such data will be used and disclosed for research purposes.
The HIPAA Privacy Rule defines research as “a systematic
investigation, including research development, testing, and
evaluation, designed to develop or contribute to generalizable
knowledge.” 121
Using this definition, research is
distinguishable from “healthcare operations.” HIPAA also
provides that the data subject’s consent can be exempted if the
data is used for reasons of healthcare operations. Healthcare
operations refer to activities involving quality assessment and
improvement activities. 122
Examples include outcome
evaluation and the development of clinical guidelines;
population-based activities related to improving health or
reducing healthcare costs; protocol development; case
management and care coordination or contacting of healthcare
providers and patients with information about treatment
alternatives; reviewing the competence or qualifications of
healthcare professionals or evaluating practitioner and
provider performance; health plan performance; conducting or
arranging for medical review, legal services, and auditing
functions; business planning and development; and business
management and general administrative activities of the
entity.123
45 C.F.R. § 164.528 (2015).
45 C.F.R. § 164.501 (2015) (definition of “research”).
122 Id. (definition of “health care operations”).
123 Id.; Steinberg v. CVS Caremark Corp., 899 F. Supp. 2d 331, 338 (E.D.
Pa. 2012) (“[F]ederal regulations permit the disclosure of Protected Health
Information under certain circumstances, including for ‘treatment, payment,
or health care operations.’ The term ‘health care operations’ is defined to
include ‘contacting of health care providers and patients with information
120
121
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The reason for distinguishing “research” from “healthcare
operations” is that when PHI is used or disclosed for research
activities, the data subject’s authorization is generally required
but may be exempted in certain circumstances. However, the
covered entity may use or disclose PHI for purposes of
healthcare operations without the data subject’s consent.124
b. Permitted Uses and Disclosures for Research Purposes
Let us apply the HIPAA Privacy Rule in the case in which
covered entities wish to use personal information for research
purposes.
The first step is to ascertain whether the
information should be recognized as individually identifiable
health information (i.e., PHI). Because the Privacy Rule is
applicable only to PHI, using non-individually identifiable
health information for medical research is not subject to the
Privacy Rule. It is important to decide whether the personal
data are PHI to apply the Privacy Rule. The Privacy Rule
contains two methods for a covered entity to determine
whether the health information is individually identifiable.
The first de-identification approach is the “safe harbor
method,” under which the covered entity has removed all of the
following eighteen enumerated identifiers from the personal
information that it has collected:
(A) Names; (B) All geographic subdivisions smaller than a State,
including street address, city, county, precinct, zip code, and their
equivalent geocodes, except for the initial three digits of a zip
code if, according to the current publicly available data from the
about treatment alternatives.’ The CAC’s allegations suggest two types of
disclosures of customer data in this case. First, the defendants, at the request
of pharmaceutical companies, include information in letters to consumers’
physicians—including patient names and prescriptions—in order to suggest
the provision of alternate medications. CAC ¶¶ 19-22. The plaintiffs do not
allege that this type of information is disclosed to any parties other than
patients’ existing health care providers or used for any purpose other than for
informing patients of treatment alternatives. This is a permissible disclosure
of PHI under HIPAA; it falls within the ‘health care operations’ exception of
Section 164.501 because it is a communication made to a health care provider
with information about treatment alternatives.”).
124 Stacey A. Tovino, The Use and Disclosure of Protected Health
Information for Research Under the HIPAA Privacy Rule: Unrealized Patient
Autonomy and Burdensome Government Regulation, 49 S.D. L. REV. 447, 454
(2004).
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Bureau of the Census: (1) The geographic unit formed by
combining all zip codes with the same three initial digits contains
more than 20,000 people; and (2) The initial three digits of a zip
code for all such geographic units containing 20,000 or fewer
people is changed to 000 ; (C) All elements of dates (except year)
for dates directly related to an individual, including birth date,
admission date, discharge date, date of death; and all ages over
89 and all elements of dates (including year) indicative of such
age, except that such ages and elements may be aggregated into
a single category of age 90 or older; (D) Telephone numbers; (E)
Fax numbers; (F) Electronic mail addresses; (G) Social security
numbers; (H) Medical record numbers; (I) Health plan
beneficiary numbers; (J) Account numbers; (K) Certificate/license
numbers; (L) Vehicle identifiers and serial numbers, including
license plate numbers; (M) Device identifiers and serial numbers;
(N) Web Universal Resource Locators (URLs); (O) Internet
Protocol (IP) address numbers; (P) Biometric identifiers,
including finger and voice prints; (Q) Full face photographic
images and any comparable images; and (R) Any other unique
identifying number, characteristic, or code, except as permitted
by paragraph (c) of this section.125

To apply this safe harbor method, it is required that the
“covered entity does not have actual knowledge that the
[remaining] information could be used alone or in combination
with other information to identify an individual who is a
subject of the information.”126
In the second approach (also known as “statistical
standard”), 127 a covered entity may determine that health
information is not individually identifiable if “a person with
appropriate knowledge of and experience with generally
accepted statistical and scientific principles and methods for
rendering information not individually identifiable.”128
After confirming whether the personal information is
individually identifiable, the principle is that the covered
entities shall obtain prior authorization before they may use or
disclose the individually identifiable health information.
45 C.F.R. § 164.514 (b)(2)(i) (2015).
Id. at (b)(2)(ii).
127 See Paul Ohm, Broken Promises of Privacy: Responding to the
Surprising Failure of Anonymization, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1701, 1737 (2010).
128 45 C.F.R. § 164.514(b)(1) (2015).
125
126
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However, because the regulator of HIPAA recognizes that the
use and disclosure of personal health information may be
necessary and beneficial to medical research, the Privacy Rule
has set forth certain exemptions for which the covered entities
may use or disclose personally identifiable information without
the authorization of data subjects, as elaborated below.
(1) “Limited Data Set” of Information: The safe harbor
method requires the removal of nearly all identifiers of
personal information that may not be helpful to achieve the
original goal of improving medial research development,
especially when the research requires the analysis of residence
locations in a contagious disease research or requires age
information to research inheritance disease.129 A modified rule,
the “limited data set” of information, is therefore adopted to
decrease the hardship that the safe harbor method has caused
to medical research.
A limited data set of information is personal information
that excludes the following direct identifiers of the individual
or of relatives, employers, or household members of the
individual:
(i) Names; (ii) Postal address information, other than town or
city, state, and zip code; (iii) Telephone numbers; (iv) Fax
numbers; (v) Electronic mail addresses; (vi) Social security
numbers; (vii) Medical record numbers; (viii) Health plan
beneficiary numbers; (ix) Account numbers; (x) Certificate/license
numbers; (xi) Vehicle identifiers and serial numbers, including
license plate numbers; (xii) Device identifiers and serial
numbers; (xiii) Web Universal Resource Locators (URLs); (xiv)
Internet Protocol (IP) address numbers; (xv) Biometric
identifiers, including finger and voice prints; and (xvi) Full face
photographic images and any comparable images.130

In the safe harbor approach, personal information is
regarded as non-personally identifiable only when all eighteen
elements to identify a person are removed. In contrast, the
limited data set approach is more flexible. For example, for an
address of a person, the town or city, state, and zip code can be
retained. It is also not mandatory to delete the date or month,
such as one’s birthdate and month, although such information
129
130

See Tovino, supra note 124, at 457.
45 C.F.R. § 164.514(e)(2) (2015).
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is usually relevant for personal identity. It is also not required
to delete any other unique identifying numbers, characteristics,
or codes. To qualify for the limited data set, users may enter
into an agreement for the use of personal data131 wherein the
users represent and guarantee that they are bound by the
applicable obligations to protect personal data, such as to reidentify the subject of the personal data.132 As such, the users
may use the limited data set information without obtaining
authorization from the data subject.133
(2) Reviews preparatory to research: The second type of
use of PHI without obtaining authorization from the data
subject involves a situation in which the researchers simply
review the information for preparatory purposes for research.
In such cases, the covered entity shall obtain from the
researcher representations that
(A) Use or disclosure is sought solely to review protected health
information as necessary to prepare a research protocol or for
similar purposes preparatory to research; (B) No protected health
information is to be removed from the covered entity by the
researcher in the course of the review; and (C) The protected
health information for which use or access is sought is necessary
for the research purposes.134

In fact, this is not equivalent to the application of PHI for
research purposes because the research work has not yet
begun.
(3) Research on decedent’s information: The third
131 Id. at (e)(4)(i) (“A covered entity may use or disclose a limited data set
under paragraph (e)(1) of this section only if the covered entity obtains
satisfactory assurance, in the form of a data use agreement that meets the
requirements of this section, that the limited data set recipient will only use
or disclose the protected health information for limited purposes.”).
132 Id. at (e)(4)(ii)(C) (“Provide that the limited data set recipient will: (1)
Not use or further disclose the information other than as permitted by the
data use agreement or as otherwise required by law; (2) Use appropriate
safeguards to prevent use or disclosure of the information other than as
provided for by the data use agreement; (3) Report to the covered entity any
use or disclosure of the information not provided for by its data use
agreement of which it becomes aware; (4) Ensure that any agents to whom it
provides the limited data set agree to the same restrictions and conditions
that apply to the limited data set recipient with respect to such information;
and (5) Not identify the information or contact the individuals.”).
133 See Tovino, supra note 124, at 458.
134 45 C.F.R. § 164.512 (i)(1)(ii) (2015).
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exception is that the covered entity may use or disclose the
decedent’s PHI if the covered entity obtains from the
researcher
(A) Representation that the use or disclosure sought is
solely for research on the protected health information of
decedents; (B) Documentation, at the request of the covered
entity, of the death of such individuals; and (C) Representation
that the protected health information for which use or
disclosure is sought is necessary for the research purposes.135
(4) Board approval of a waiver of authorization: The fourth
exception for which no authorization is necessary from the data
subject for the covered entity to use or disclose PHI is when the
covered entity has obtained from the institutional review board
(“IRB”) 136 or the privacy board 137 an approval of a waiver of
authorization. To qualify for this exception, the covered entity
should obtain written documentation regarding the
following:138
a. The waiver of authorization has been approved by either an
IRB or a privacy board meeting specified standards; b. A
statement identifying the IRB or privacy board and the date on
which the alteration or waiver of authorization was approved; c.
The IRB or privacy board has determined that the alteration or
waiver, in whole or in part, of authorization, satisfies three
criteria; d. A brief description of the protected health information
for which use or access has been determined to be necessary by
the IRB or privacy board; e. A statement that the alteration or
waiver of authorization has been reviewed and approved under
either normal or expedited review procedures; and f. The
Id. at (i)(1)(iii).
Id. at (i)(1)(iii)(A) (“An Institutional Review Board (IRB), established
in accordance with 7 CFR lc.107, 10 CFR 745.107, 14 CFR 1230.107, 15 CFR
27.107, 16 CFR 1028.107, 21 CFR 56.107, 22 CFR 225.107, 24 CFR 60.107, 28
CFR 46.107, 32 CFR 219.107, 34CFR 97.107, 38 CFR 16.107, 40 CFR 26.107,
45 CFR 46.107, 45 CFR 690.107, or 49 CFR 11.107.”).
137 Id. at (i)(1)(iii)(B) (“A privacy board that: (1) Has members with
varying backgrounds and appropriate professional competency as necessary
to review the effect of the research protocol on the individual’s privacy rights
and related interests; (2) Includes at least one member who is not affiliated
with the covered entity, not affiliated with any entity conducting or
sponsoring the research, and not related to any person who is affiliated with
any of such entities; and (3) Does not have any member , participating in a
review of any project in which the member has a conflict of interest.”).
138 Id. at (i)(2)(i).
135
136
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documentation of the alteration or waiver of authorization must
be signed by the chair or other member, as designated by the
chair, of the IRB or the privacy board, as applicable. 139

In the above requirement (c), the IRB or privacy board
must review whether the following three elements are
satisfied:
(A) The use or disclosure of protected health information involves
no more than a minimal risk to the privacy of individuals, based
on, at least, the presence of the following elements. . . (B) The
research could not practicably be conducted without the waiver
or alteration; and (C) The research could not practicably be
conducted without access to and use of the protected health
information.140

C. Applying the PDPA and HIPAA to Tsai
Pursuant to Article 6, Paragraph 2 of Taiwan’s PDPA, the
scope, procedure and applicable rules for government agencies
or academic research institutions to collect, use or disclose
personal medical or health information for medical, sanitation,
statistical or academic research purposes shall be designed by
the relevant central authorities after consultation with the
Ministry of Justice.141 MHW is in the process of drafting the
regulations that will serve a similar function as the HIPAA
Privacy Rule.142 Therefore, the Privacy Rule is an important
source of foreign law that would aid the MHW in forming the
regulations to implement Taiwan’s PDPA in terms of personal
health information.
1. A Comparative Law Study of the PDPA and HIPAA
Privacy Rule
One of the key issues in the Tsai case is whether the
Plaintiff has a legal standing to stop the defendant from using
Tovino, supra note 124, at 459-60 (citation omitted).
45 C.F.R. § 164.512(i)(2)(ii).
141 PDPA, supra note 17, at art. 6, ¶ 2.
142
See 江 睿 智 [Jiang Rui Zhi], 健 保 巨 量 資 料 將 開 放 研 究 [], 經 濟 日 報
[ECONOMIC DAILY NEWS] (Aug. 12, 2014), http://health.udn.com/health/story
/5999/370275-%E5%81%A5%E4%BF%9D%E5%B7
%A8%E9%87%8F%E8%
B3%87%E696%99-%E5%B0%87%E9%96%8B%E6
%94%BE%E7%A0%94%E7%A9%B6.
139
140
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or disclosing personal data to protect his information
privacy. 143 The Taiwan PDPA and the U.S. HIPAA Privacy
Rule both abide by the first rule that personal autonomy
should be respected and that an individual should freely decide
how his personal data may be used.144 Under this concept, the
basic rule is that the covered entity should obtain written
consent from the data subject before using or disclosing
personal health information.145 Nonetheless, both the Taiwan
PDPA and the U.S. HIPAA Privacy Rule recognize that the use
and disclosure of personal health information may aid medical
research.146 As such, a number of exceptions are imposed in
both laws for the data subject’s authorization to be exempted
for research purposes. There are a number of differences
between the two laws, which are summarized as follows.
a. Difference of Covered Entities
The HIPAA Privacy Rule limits its application to the
covered entities and business associates because these parties
regularly address a substantial volume of personal health data.
The PDPA, in contrast, has broader coverage and is applicable
to all public agencies and academic research institutions. Both
public agencies and academic research institutions usually
possess a substantial volume of personal health data.
However, in addition to medical research institutions, entities
such as insurance companies or medical service providers may
regularly address large volumes of personal health data.
Although Article 6 of the PDPA stipulates that sensitive
personal data, including medical and health data, are subject
to a higher level of privacy protection and requests that the
MHW should implement a regulation to set forth the rules for
protecting health data, it is important for the MHW to consider
which entities address substantial health data and are most
likely to use or disclose health data for research purposes and
therefore should be subject to the PDPA and the privacy
regulations. The approach the MHW should adopt is to
143
144
145
146

Tsai, No. 102-Su-36, at reasoning ¶ iii.
See supra Parts III.A and III.B,.
See id.
See supra Parts III.A.3 and III.B.2,.
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consider which entities possess a large volume of personal
health data rather than to decide which entities qualify for the
definition of academic research institutions.
b. The Covenants to Use or Disclose Health Data for
Research Purposes
In the absence of authorization by the data subject, the
PDPA provides an exemption for the data controller to collect
or use personal data when it is necessary for public interest on
statistics or for academic research conducted by a research
institution. The data may not lead to the identification of a
certain person; neither the manner nor disclosure can identify
an individual; or the data must have been de-identified. In
contrast, the HIPAA Privacy Rule provides three exemptions:
reviews preparatory to research, research on decedent’s
information, and IRB’s or privacy board’s approval of a waiver
of authorization. For the research on decedent’s information,
although the PDPA does not expressly provides an exemption
for the disclosure or use of decedent’s information, the
application of the PDPA would result in the same conclusion
because the deceased’s information is excluded from the PDPA.
It is expressly stipulated in Article 2 of the PDPA regulations,
i.e., in the Enforcement Rules of the Personal Information
Protection Act, that “A person referred to in the PDPA means a
living nature person.”147 The other two exemptions where the
data controller is permitted to collect and process personal data
without obtaining consents from the data subject is worthy of
consideration for the MHW to include in the drafting of privacy
rules, in particular the board approval of a waiver of
authorization, to be elaborated below.
c. The Definition of PHI
In the HIPAA Privacy Rule, a clear definition of health
information is given because it is an important premise as to
whether a certain piece of information should be categorized as
personally identifiable health information. Instead of defining
Enforcement Rules of the Personal Information Protection Act, supra
note 66, at art. 2.
147
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personally identifiable health information in the PDPA, the
PDPA legislator has authorized the MHW to define it in the
regulations that the MHW is drafting. The Privacy Rule may
serve as important reference material in the MHW draft
regulations.
Before the regulations are written and
implemented, because the relevant provisions in the PDPA
related to sensitive personal data are not yet effective, the
pertinent case involving personal health data is subject to the
general provisions that also apply to other types of nonsensitive data. In considering whether the data controller may
use personal health data for other purposes without obtaining
the data subject’s authorization or consent under the exception
in which “the manner of disclosure or the processed data is
unlikely to identify a certain person,” the interpretation of the
above rule may take into account the Privacy Rule.
2. Shortages of HIPAA Privacy Rule and PDPA in Data
Privacy Issues
a. The Adequacy of Depriving the Data Subject’s DecisionMaking Right for His Own Health Data
The traditional information privacy mechanism was
designed based on the premise of a control-driven approach and
developed pursuant to the fair information practice principles
(FIPPs).148 A fair observation is that this traditional approach
focuses on the procedural phase to ensure that the data subject
has the right to decide whether and how his personal data are
collected and used. There are a number of commonly known
U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE, SEC’Y’S ADVISORY COMM. ON
AUTOMATED PERS. DATA SYS., RECORDS, COMPUTERS, AND THE RIGHTS OF
CITIZENS XX-XXI (1973), http://www.justice.gov/opcl/docs/rec-com-rights.pdf.
(The Fair Information Practice rests on five basic principles: “[1.] There must
be no personal data record-keeping systems whose very existence is secret . . .
[2.] There must be a way for an individual to find out what information about
him is in a record and how it is used. . . . [3.] There must be a way for an
individual to prevent information about him that was obtained for one
purpose from being used or made available for other purposes without his
consent. . . . [4.] There must be a way for an individual to correct or amend a
record of identifiable information about him. . . [5.] Any organization
creating, maintaining, using, or disseminating records of identifiable
personal data must assure the reliability of the data for their intended use
and must take precautions to prevent misuse of the data.”).
148
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principles surrounding the FIPPs, including notice-and-choice
(informed consent) and transparency rules. All of these rules
have the same goal of ensuring the data subject’s full control
over his personal data.
The crux of Tsai rests on the issue that the data subject
cannot exercise his right to prevent his personal data from
being applied for the nation’s medical research projects. Both
the PDPA and the Privacy Rule make it possible for a person’s
right to control his personal information to not be fully
protected even if highly sensitive health data are involved. The
legislators of the PDPA and the Privacy Rule seem to have
decided that the public interest that may be generated by
medical research trumps the right of health privacy when
making policy decisions. However, if we acknowledge that the
core concept of information privacy is to ensure one’s right to
control over his personal information, we should not ignore the
possibility that the controller’s collection and use of such data
would endanger the fundamental value of information privacy.
This type of invasion of human rights is especially intolerable
in civil law countries where the core of constitutional
fundamental human rights is guaranteed. 149 As such, it is
important to present a modified information privacy theory to
justify the policy decisions of the PDPA or the Privacy Rule.
b. The PII/Non-PII Dichotomy Approach Falls Short of
Dealing with Data Use for Medical Research
The PDPA adopted a dichotomous approach to distinguish
personal information into identifiable and non-identifiable
information. Only identifiable information is protected in the
PDPA. The HIPAA Privacy Rule adopts a similar rule in terms
of health data, and only personally identifiable health
information is subject to the Privacy Rule. There is a special
category of personal health information created in the Privacy
Rule, a limited data set of information, to accommodate the
need for academic research. The limited data set allows
research to disclose or use personal data, including the
subject’s address, birth date/month/year and any other unique
李惠宗 [LI HUI ZONG], 憲法要義 [THE ESSENCE
85 (4th ed. 2008).
149

OF THE
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identifying number, characteristic, or code without obtaining
the authorization of the data subject as long as the controller
has signed an agreement in a form acceptable in the Privacy
Rule.
This article proposes that a more delicate approach may be
developed to modify the above dichotomous method. One of the
methodologies could be categorization, that is, setting forth
different types of personal information and granting all such
information different degrees of privacy protection. Another
possible approach is to leave the decision to the IRB or the
privacy board to conduct a case-by-case review.
IV. Suggestions of Modifications to the Information
Privacy Theory
The Tsai case highlights the data protection issue when
the government intends to use personal data for purposes that
were not expressly intended by individuals when providing
their data. The crux of the dispute lies in the controversy of
whether the NHIA has the authority to disclose the Health
Insurance Data that it has collected in the course of performing
its statutory authority in operating national healthcare affairs
for purposes other than those for which individuals were
notified when consenting to the collection of the Health
Insurance Data. The purpose of the use of this health
information is mostly related to the public interest, and the
difficult issue is whether data reuse for public interest
overrides the privacy interest of data subjects when the data
subjects have expressly raised objections to such data reuse.
The data involved here are health data, which are generally
classified as sensitive data and require a higher level of privacy
protection compared to non-sensitive personal data. The
interest in protecting the privacy of the subjects of health
information competes with the benefits, as the NHIA has
alleged, of applying the Health Insurance Data collaboratively
with other data in conducting academic research with the goal
of improving the provision of healthcare services and helping to
reform national health policies, which is presumably valuable
to society as a whole. The need to place a higher level of
privacy protection on health information compared to
situations in which only non-sensitive data are involved creates
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more difficulty in weighing the two competing interests in this
dispute.
The reasoning of the Tsai court judgment signals that one
cannot assert one’s right of autonomy as an absolute right in a
conflict of medical research interests. This position obviously
poses a great challenge to the traditionally recognized privacy
protection principle, FIPPs, which is primarily grounded on the
premise that the data subject retains and controls his personal
data. The Tsai court judgment’s position, which denied the
absolute right of individual to have control over his personal
data, will render the long-adopted FIPPs impossible to sustain.
This article provides an analysis of the effect on FIPPs as a
result of this court judgment on health information.
The only sensible means of addressing this problem is to
return to the basic question of why we need to protect
information privacy.
Only when the rationale for the
protection of information privacy is properly perceived can we
resolve this dispute. This chapter will examine and restructure
the concepts of privacy.
A. A Concept of Pluralistic Value of Privacy
The right to privacy can be observed in multiple legal
concepts. The United State Supreme Court, in adjudicating
privacy disputes, does not attempt to characterize privacy as a
single concept and has recognized that privacy can be divided
into three categories. 150 The first well-known concept is
“decisional privacy,” which the Court has characterized as a
fundamental right of personal decision making regarding
“marriage, procreation, contraception, consensual sexual
relations, family relationships, child rearing, and education.”151
Additionally, based on the Fourth Amendment, 152 the Court
150 See Jerry Kang, Information Privacy in Cyberspace Transactions, 50
STAN. L. REV. 1193, 1202-05 (1998); Yvonne F. Lindgren, Personal Autonomy:
Towards a New Taxonomy for Privacy Law, 31 WOMEN’S RTS. REP. 447, 45168 (2009); Fred H. Cate & Beth E. Cate, The Supreme Court and information
privacy,
2(4)
INT’L
DATA
PRIVACY
L.
255,
256
(2012),
http://idpl.oxfordjournals.org/content/2/4/255.full.pdf+html.
151 Cate & Cate, supra note 144, at 257.
152 U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
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interprets “spatial (or physical) privacy” as the right to be free
from unreasonable search and seizure. 153 The third privacy
concept is “information privacy (data privacy),” which refers to
the constitutional right of an individual to protect
himself/herself from the invasion of government-compelled
disclosure of personal information and the right to control
information about oneself.154
The right to freedom of residence and the right to
confidential communications, as granted by Articles 10 and 12
in the Taiwanese Constitution,155 generally mirror the right to
spatial (or physical) privacy and information privacy as
declared by the U.S. Supreme Court.
The Taiwanese
Constitutional Court also declared in its decision No. 603 that
the right to privacy granted in Article 22 of the Taiwanese
Constitution 156 encompasses the right to refrain from the
invasion of private spatial and physical areas as well as the
right to control information about oneself.157
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing
the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”).
153 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 348 (1967) (holding that the
Government’s eavesdropping activities violated the privacy upon which
petitioner justifiably relied while using the telephone booth and thus
constituted a ‘search and seizure’ within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment and because the Fourth Amendment protects people rather than
places, presence or absence of a physical intrusion in any given enclosure is
not determinative.); see also Neil M. Richards, The Information Privacy Law
Project, 94 GEO. L.J. 1087 (2006).
154 Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 600 (1977) (“The mere existence in
readily available form of the information about patients’ use of Schedule II
drugs creates a genuine concern that the information will become publicly
known and that it will adversely affect their reputations. This concern makes
some patients reluctant to use, and some doctors reluctant to prescribe, such
drugs even when their use is medically indicated. It follows, they argue, that
the making of decisions about matters vital to the care of their health is
inevitably affected by the statute. Thus, the statute threatens to impair both
their interest in the nondisclosure of private information and also their
interest in making important decisions independently.”).
155 MINGUO XIANFA art. 10 (1947) http://db.lawbank.com.tw/Eng/FLAW/
FLAWDAT01.asp?lsid=FL000001 (“The people shall have freedom of
residence and of change of residence.”); Id. at art. 12 (“The people shall have
freedom of privacy of correspondence.”).
156 Id. at art. 22 (“All other freedoms and rights of the people that are
not detrimental to social order or public welfare shall be guaranteed under
the Constitution.”).
157 See Interp. No. 603, Sīfǎ yuàn fǎxué zīliào jiǎnsuǒ xìtǒng (司法院法學
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The three privacy concepts declared by the U.S. Supreme
Court and the two privacy categories confirmed by the
Taiwanese Constitutional Court both indicate that the
constitutional right to privacy has more than just a single
meaning.
In U.S. tort law, privacy is protected based on multiple
types of interests. In 1960, in his essay titled “Privacy,”
Professor William L. Prosser identified four types of privacy
invasion in U.S. tort law. 158 The first type is the right to
refrain from intrusion upon one’s seclusion or solitude or into
his private affairs.159 The second is the right to refuse public
disclosure of private facts.160 The third type of privacy tort is
recognized when one is placed in a false light in the public
eye.161 The last privacy tort refers to appropriation conducted
for the wrongdoer’s advantage of the plaintiff’s name or
likeness.162 The above four types of privacy harm were later
recognized in the Restatement (Second) of Torts edited by
Prosser and have since become generally accepted tort law
concepts.163
Unlike the above U.S. common law privacy torts, tort law
in Taiwan adopts a continental (civil) law regime wherein torts
are expressly stipulated in the respective statutory provisions.
The Civil Code of Taiwan in Article 18164 presents the general
資料檢索系統) [Judicial Yuan Of The Republic of China Law and Regulations
Retrieving
System],
(Sept.
28,
2005)
(Taiwan),
http://jirs.judicial.gov.tw/eng/CETransfer.asp?goto=c&datatype=c02&code=60
3 (translation available at http://jirs.judicial.gov.tw/eng/FINT/FINTQRY
03.asp?Y1=2004&M1=&D1=&Y2=&M2=&D2=&cno=&kw=&btnSubmit=Sear
ch&sdate=20040000&edate=99991231&keyword=&page=12&total=148&seq
=125).
158 See Prosser, supra note 13, at 389.
159 Id. at 389-92.
160 Id. at 392-98.
161 Id. at 398-401.
162 Id. at 401-07.
163 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A (AM. LAW INST. 1977).
164 MÍNFǍ ( 民 法 ) [CIVIL CODE OF TAIWAN] art. 18 (2014) (Taiwan),
http://db.lawbank.com.tw/ENG/FLAW/FLAWDAT01.asp?lsid=FL001351
[hereinafter CIVIL CODE OF TAIWAN] (“When one’s personality is infringed,
one may apply to the court for removing. When one’s personality is in danger
of being infringed, one may apply for prevention. In the preceding paragraph,
an action for damages for emotional distress may be brought only if it is
otherwise provided by the act.”).
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elements of invasion of personal rights and stipulates in
respective articles the various types of personal rights,
including health, reputation, credibility and privacy rights.165
When invasion of privacy is alleged, the most relevant
provisions the court applies to adjudicate are Articles 184 166
and Paragraph I of Article 195, which provide that when one
party illegally invades another party’s privacy right, either
intentionally or negligently, the first party shall be responsible
for compensating the aggrieved party’s damage suffered as a
result of such wrongdoing.167 When the violation is significant
and has caused non-economic losses to the aggrieved party, the
compensation shall include such non-economic losses.168 If the
above-mentioned four types of U.S. privacy torts are litigated
in Taiwan, the first two privacy torts―invasion of private life
and disclosure of personal matters—will be adjudicated under
Articles 184169 and Paragraph I of Article 195.170 With regard
to the privacy of “false light,” which is recognized as privacy
tort under U.S. tort law, the Taiwan court does not adjudicate
this issue under the privacy tort law. Rather, allegations of
false light are generally regarded as a general type of
personality tort.171 With regard to the last type of U.S. privacy
tort, appropriation, the court normally regards this as the right
of likeness instead of applying the privacy torts.172
Id. at art. 195.
Id. at art. 184 (“A person who, intentionally or negligently, has
wrongfully damaged the rights of another is bound to compensate him for any
injury arising therefrom. The same rule shall be applied when the injury is
done intentionally in a manner against the rules of morals. A person, who
violates a statutory provision enacted for the protection of others and
therefore prejudice to others, is bound to compensate for the injury, except no
negligence in his act can be proved.”).
167 Id. at art. 195, ¶ 1 (“If a person has wrongfully damaged to the body,
health, reputation, liberty, credit, privacy or chastity of another, or to
another’s personality in a severe way, the injured person may claim a
reasonable compensation in money even if such injury is not a purely
pecuniary loss. If it was reputation that has been damaged, the injured
person may also claim the taking of proper measures for the rehabilitation of
his reputation.”).
168 See J.Y. Interp. No. 603, supra note 157, at holding ¶ 1.
169 CIVIL CODE OF TAIWAN art. 184.
170 Id. at art. 195, ¶ 1.
171 王澤鑑 [WANG ZE JIAN], 人格權法 [RÉNGÉ QUÁN FǍ] [PERSONALITY LAW]
268 (2012).
172
Taiwan Supreme Court No. 93-Tai-Shang-706 (Apr. 8, 2004)
165

166

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol28/iss1/2

52

2 CHEN-HUNG CHANG (DO NOT DELETE)

2016]

8/10/2016 9:50 AM

DESKTOP PUBLISHING EXAMPLE

81

From the above, we may conclude that in both U.S.
common tort law and Taiwan civil tort law, the right to privacy
is a multi-faceted legal concept that is inherently difficult to
comprehend with a single definition.
B. The Methodology of Constructing the Concept of Privacy
1. The Privacy Interest Approach
To establish the infrastructure of legal concepts of privacy,
the most straightforward manner is to identify the privacy
interests that require protection. Two major approaches are
commonly adopted, as elaborated in the paragraphs below.
a. A Unified Definition of Privacy Concept
The first approach is to look for a unified definition of the
content of core values of privacy. Some have proposed that the
core value of privacy is to make things private,173 which is a
simplified definition.
Other propositions attempt to give
privacy a more comprehensive definition by defining privacy as
the right to ensure self-development, self-respect, friendship,
love and trust.174 Some definitions are based on control theory
by defining privacy as “control over access to oneself and to
information about oneself.”175 Similar propositions state that
privacy is the right to “control over when and by whom the
(physical) parts of us (as identifiable persons) can be seen or
heard (in person or by use of photographs, recordings, TV, etc.),
touched, smelled, or tasted by others.”176 Some propose that
(Taiwan).
173 See Daniel J. Solove, Understanding Privacy, HARV. U. PRESS, May
2008, at 14.
174 Charles Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE L.J. 475, 482 (1967) (“Privacy is
closely implicated in the notions of respect and self-respect, and of love,
friendship and trust. Quite apart from any philosophical analysis this is
intuitively obvious. In this section I shall try to make the connection explicit.
In general it is my thesis that in developed social contexts love, friendship
and trust are only possible if persons enjoy and accord to each other a certain
measure of privacy.”).
175 Adam D. Moore, Toward Informational Privacy Rights, 44 SAN DIEGO
L. REV. 809, 812 (2007).
176 Richard B. Parker, A Definition of Privacy, 27 RUTGERS L. REV. 275,
283-84 (1974).
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privacy should be understood as the right to determine the
conditions for realizing personal identity, in which privacy is
defined as a matter of establishing the boundaries between the
self and others. 177 Some understand privacy as individual
“autonomy” and propose that privacy “generally involve[s] an
interest in independence in making certain fundamental or
personal decisions, and thus they do concern autonomy to
determine for oneself what to do.”178 Privacy is also defined as
“the claim of individuals, groups, or institutions to determine
for themselves when, how and to what extent information
about them is communicated to others.”179
However, none of the above definitions alone can properly
address privacy disputes. If the definition of privacy is too
abstract, it is impractical to apply it to real cases to resolve
privacy controversies, and the definition does not aid in the
clarification of the concept of privacy. For example, viewing
privacy as the right to ensure individual autonomy or to ensure
self-respect does not help in providing a universal definition of
privacy. Nearly every human right is related to the right to
make one’s own decisions because everyone should have the
right to determine his personal living style, which involves the
fundamental human right of all living beings to protect their
dignity. Because all human rights stem from the right to make
one’s own decisions and control one’s life, this basic definition
(i.e., self-control) is not unique to the right to privacy and is
therefore not appropriate to serve as the definition of privacy.
If privacy is nothing more than the right to ensure autonomy
and independence of one’s decisions, there is no need to give
privacy special protection. In other words, if we propose that
privacy is a stand-alone human right, there must be certain
interests that must be protected by enforcing the right to
privacy. If privacy is defined as the right to ensure selfdetermination, this definition fails to distinguish the right to
privacy from other human rights because other rights also
share this common nature, and it would be questionable
177

(2014).

Thomas P. Crocker, Ubiquitous Privacy, 66 OKLA. L. REV. 791, 792

178 JUDITH WAGNER DECEW, IN
THE RISE OF TECHNOLOGY 44 (1997).
179

PURSUIT

OF

PRIVACY: LAW, ETHICS,

AND

ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 7 (1967).
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whether privacy deserves the status of a stand-alone human
right.
In contrast, a narrow definition of privacy would fail to
protect the right to privacy. If privacy is defined as the right to
protect private matters, by this definition, the right to privacy
would fail to protect personal matters that have been made
public because such information is not “private.” With regard
to claiming privacy as one’s right to “control” his personal
information, this right may be too broad and may hinder other
human rights and public interests. As an example, if the goal
is to allow everyone to be in full control of his/her personal
information, personal information would not be allowed to flow
freely and could not achieve the benefits that can only be
achieved through the free flow of information.180
b. Categorizing Different Types of Privacy Interests
The above paragraph has illustrated that the attempt to
find a universal definition of privacy will face the problem of
insufficiently protecting privacy or overly protecting privacy.
Therefore, some propose another option, which is to recognize
that privacy is multi-faceted and contains various interests and
rights and should therefore be defined from different angles.181
This methodology has been adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court
affirming that privacy has three categories. Some scholars
have proposed more detailed categories for privacy. Professor
Fred H. Cate presents the following aspects of privacy:
(1) individual autonomy (the right to make decisions about
marriage or family without government interference); (2) solitude
and intimacy (the desire to limit access to a place or to oneself);
(3) confidentiality (trade secrets and information disclosed
subject to a promise of confidentiality); (4) anonymity (the desire
not to be identified); (5) security (for oneself or one’s information);
(6) freedom from intrusion—whether physical (a trespasser) or
technological (a hidden camera or microphone); (7) control of

180 Ohm, supra note 127, at 1736 (“The free flow of information fuels the
mode economy, nourishes our hunger for knowledge, shines a light on the
inner workings of powerful institutions and organizations, and represents an
exercise of liberty.”).
181 See Solove, supra note 168, at 41.
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information about oneself.182

Professor Daniel J. Solove provides the following
definitions of privacy: (1) “the right to be let alone;” 183 (2)
“limited access to the self;”184 (3) “secrecy;”185 (4) “control over
personal information;” 186 (5) “personhood” (the protection of
one’s personality, individuality, and dignity); 187 and (6)
“intimacy” (control over or limited access to one’s intimate
relationships or aspects of life).188
We can compare the above with the three types of privacy
affirmed by the U.S. Supreme Court. Decisional privacy refers
to the interest of making decisions about personal intimate
matters.
Therefore, the focus is whether the matter is
“intimate,” that should be decided by the relevant persons.189
As to whether such private matters or relationships should be
kept secret or confidential, this does not relate to the core of the
definition of decisional privacy.
In this respect, if one
disseminates videos downloaded from public sources containing
others’ sexual images, it would still likely be regarded as an
invasion of privacy if the persons involved in the video did not
give their consent to make the videos public because in such a
case, the right to make a decision about intimate matters has
been injured.
Spatial (or physical) privacy is respect for others’ right to
be let alone and to protect one’s solitude. Therefore, it is
necessary to limit access to a space or to oneself. For example,
while a person is dining in a restaurant (which is a public
place), if he has expressly indicated his intention to not be
bothered (such as reserving an individual room of the
restaurant), others’ intrusion into the room is likely to be
regarded as an invasion of privacy.
Information privacy claims that privacy is the right of a
FRED H. CATE, PRVACY IN PERSPECTIVE 3-4 (2001).
See Solove, supra note 168, at 15-18.
184 See id. at 18-21.
185 See id. at 21-24.
186 See id. at 24-29.
187 See id. at 29-34.
188 See id. at 34-37.
189 See generally Heidi Reamer Anderson, Plotting Privacy as Intimacy,
46 IND. L. REV. 311 (2013).
182
183
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person to be in control of information about himself. The
reason is that if one’s personal information falls into the hands
of others and is used in any manner desirable by the holder of
such information, the subject of the data is subject to a huge
risk that his credit cards may be used and his identity may be
stolen, leading to possible damage to the person’s interests.
Therefore, since the type of personal data at issue is more
closely related to the right of one’s identity, a higher degree of
protection should be granted to the right of personal control.
Each of the above concepts of protecting privacy has a
specific focus but overlap in some respects. Matters that one
wishes to keep private are usually those about one’s intimacy.
The desire to limit access to oneself or to be let alone usually
involves decision to maintain secrecy.
The control of
information about oneself usually involves the decision of
whether to limit access to such information by others to limit
access to intimate relationships and to maintain the secrecy of
certain aspects of life.
Due to the overlapping concepts of these notions of privacy,
there are sometimes confusions and difficulties in
distinguishing these different concepts. For example, special
privacy claims the desire to limit access to personal space from
intrusion. It is, in fact, a decision about oneself to protect one’s
solitude.
In this respect, “solitude” is intertwined with
“individual autonomy.”
Moreover, the element of
confidentiality is often considered when evaluating the
interests of privacy protection. For example, it is a common
proposition that publicly available and non-confidential
information is not protected by the right to privacy. However,
if the focus of information privacy is to protect one’s right to
control his personal information, whether such information is
confidential should not affect the determination of privacy
protection.
To summarize, establishing a legal concept
infrastructure of privacy by differentiating respective privacy
interests and developing multiple privacy concepts may be a
theoretically correct methodology. However, applying the
various privacy concepts could lead to insufficient protection
privacy due to the overlapping areas of different concepts of
privacy.
In addition to the above-mentioned privacy notions
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stemming from the individual value of privacy, some scholars
have recently proposed concepts of privacy based on social
value.190 This social-value-oriented theory was inspired by the
concept that privacy is a notion generated in the course of a
social life; therefore, the value of privacy cannot be correctly
perceived without considering the social context.191 The society
in which one lives influences how privacy is perceived.
Therefore, privacy protection should include the subjective
expectation of individuals as well as objective elements from
Professor Julie E. Cohen proposes that
society. 192
“[s]ubjectivity, and hence selfhood, exists in the space between
the experience of autonomous selfhood and the reality of social
shaping.”193 This notion recognizes the social value of privacy
and ensures a harmonious link between personal selfhood and
societal norms. In other words, privacy “enables situated
subjects to navigate within preexisting cultural and social
matrices, creating spaces for the play and the work of selfmaking.”194
Privacy has an important function in fostering democracy;
therefore, the genuine value of privacy must include its social
aspect. The political scientist Priscilla M. Regan analyzes
privacy in a social context and contends that the benefits of
privacy protection include resisting the abuse of government
power and fostering democracy.195 In the Arab Spring, which
190 See generally Chen-Hung Chang, New Technology, New Information
Privacy: Social-Value-Oriented Information Privacy Theory, 10 N.T.U. L. REV.
127, 147-50 (2015); Arthur J. Cockfield, Protecting the Social Value of Privacy
in the Context of State Investigations Using New Technologies, 40 U.B.C. L.
REV. 41, 49-59 (2007).
191 Julie E. Cohen, Symposium, What Privacy is For, 126 HARV. L. REV.
1904, 1905 (2013) (“[L]iberal privacy theory’s descriptive premises about both
the self and the nature of privacy are wrong. The self has no autonomous,
precultural core, nor could it, because we are born and remain situated
within social and cultural contexts.”).
192 Id. at 1927 (“Privacy does not only protect individuals. Privacy
furthers fundamental public policy goals relating to liberal democratic
citizenship, innovation, and human flourishing, and those purposes must be
taken into account when making privacy policy.”).
193 Id. at 1909.
194 Id. at 1911.
195 PRISCILLA M. REGAN, LEGISLATING PRIVACY: TECHNOLOGY, SOCIAL
VALUES, AND PUBLIC POLICY 225-27 (1995) (“Privacy has value not just to
individuals as individuals or to all individuals in common but also to the
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was also called the “Jasmine Revolution,” which occurred in
2011 throughout the countries of the Arab world, 196 online
social networks played an important role in the protests. The
catalyst of protests was the self-immolation of a young man
who was unable to find work and who was selling vegetables at
a roadside stand until a municipal inspector confiscated his
wares.197 His unfortunate death and the image of him dousing
himself with gasoline and setting himself on fire was
broadcasted through social media, leading many people who
were dissatisfied with the existing system to begin the
revolution
and
overthrow
the
twenty-three-year-long
dictatorship government of Tunisia. 198 The protests then
spread to other Arab countries. In these protests, social media
such as Facebook and Twitter provided a valuable platform for
people to express and communicate pro-democracy messages
and helped the revolution fight against poor treatments by the
dictatorship government.
In the Arab Spring, if the
governments had known who was initiating the protests and
disseminating anti-government comments, the governments
would have detained those who initiated the actions before
they were able to upload messages to social media, and the
messages would not have been circulated. In this case, when
an individual is protected by information privacy rights to
freely express his thoughts without fear, it also benefits society
and fosters democracy.
In summary, if a concept of privacy is fundamentally based
on one’s right to control things about oneself, this privacy is
unlikely to prevail when it conflicts with the social benefits
that represent public interests. If privacy is based on an
individual’s own value, the government would lack standing to
intervene in affairs between private sectors. In view of these
deficiencies of the individual value of privacy, this article
democratic political system.”).
196 See Delinda C. Hanley, Tunisia’s Jasmine Revolution, WASH. REP.
(Mar.
2011),
http://www.wrmea.org/2011-march/three-views-tunisia-sjasmine-revolution.html.
197 See Arab Uprising: Country by Country – Tunisia, BBC NEWS (Dec.
16, 2013), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-12482315.
198 See Delinda C. Hanley, Tunisia’s Jasmine Revolution, WASH. REP.
(Mar.
2011),
http://www.wrmea.org/2011-march/three-views-tunisia-sjasmine-revolution.html.
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proposes that privacy should incorporate social value. Using a
concept of privacy with a social context, the government would
be able to use its power to intervene to protect privacy.
2. The Privacy Harm Approach
If privacy is understood as the right to protect certain
interests, this methodology is likely to claim an over-broad
territory of privacy and to infringe on other rights or public
interests. For example, when privacy is defined as the right to
control information about oneself, activities that relate to the
collection, processing and use of personal information cannot be
conducted without the consent of the subject of the data
because such activities will affect the interests of information
privacy. However, the interest of controlling one’s personal
information is an abstract concept that assumes that there are
certain information privacy interests that require protection;
therefore, people should be protected to have full control over
information about themselves. However, when this right to
control is affected to a certain degree, it is uncertain whether
corresponding harm will occur. To address this effect, a
methodology has been proposed to comprehend a legal concept
of privacy and to categorize different types of potential privacy
harm that are likely to be affected. This approach has been
adopted in U.S. privacy tort law. The Third Circuit court in
United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 199 several factors
were considered to evaluate the potential harm in determining
if information privacy was injured. The Court reasoned that
“the potential for harm in any subsequent nonconsensual
disclosure, the injury from disclosure to the relationship in
which the record was generated.”200
199

1980).

United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d 570 (3d Cir.

200 Id. at 578 (3d Cir. 1980) (“The factors which should be considered in
deciding whether an intrusion into an individual’s privacy is justified are the
type of record requested, the information it does or might contain, the
potential for harm in any subsequent nonconsensual disclosure, the injury
from disclosure to the relationship in which the record was generated, the
adequacy of safeguards to prevent unauthorized disclosure, the degree of
need for access, and whether there is an express statutory mandate,
articulated public policy, or other recognizable public interest militating
toward access.”).
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Out of the many methodological approaches, this privacyharm based methodology was chosen by the U.S. White House
in its Administration Discussion Draft: Consumer Privacy Bill
of Rights Act of 2015. 201 In Section 4, Definitions, “‘Privacy
risk’ means the potential for personal data, on its own or when
linked to other information about an individual, to cause
emotional distress, or physical, financial, professional or other
harm to an individual.”202 The “privacy risk” approach in the
Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights Act of 2015 is based on the
similar concept that a definition of privacy should consider the
potential harm associated with the claimed privacy right.
Defining privacy rights from the angle of potential harm
can better address the relationship between individual privacy
and the related social context than other perspectives. This
means that when one is recognized to have an abstract privacy
interest, the existence of this privacy interest does not lead to
the conclusion that objective privacy harm would be caused if
the privacy interest were injured in any manner. The risk to
privacy harm in the disclosure of personal information should
be determined based on the social context of the circumstances.
For example, it is a general understanding that one should
have full control over all information about his cell phone usage
and should have the right to information privacy over such
information.
A cell phone service provider developed a
communication app that aims to make it possible for all users
to know which service providers their phone book contacts are
using so that the app users may decide whether to make phone
calls to control their phone bills. It is true that the phone
company that one uses is personal information, and the app’s
disclosure of such information might have affected people’s
right to control information about themselves. However, it is
worth noting that such behavior does not necessarily cause
harm to the phone user. In other words, the disclosure of
information about the phone company of a phone user does not
necessarily raise a privacy harm risk to individuals. The
201
WHITE HOUSE, ADMINISTRATION DISCUSSION DRAFT: CONSUMER
PRIVACY
BILL
OF
RIGHTS
ACT
OF
2015
(2015),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/legislative/letters/cpbract-of-2015-discussion-draft.pdf.
202 Id. at 4.
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potential privacy risk should depend on the social context in
which the alleged privacy infringement is situated.
To summarize, privacy cannot be fully comprehended
without knowing the associated social “contextual integrity.”203
Information privacy, then, is “a right to live in a world in which
our expectations about the flow of personal information are, for
the most part, met; expectations that are shaped not only by
force of habit and convention but a general confidence in the
mutual support these flows accord to key organizing principles
of social life, including moral and political ones.”204
Observing privacy from potential harm does not mean that
privacy cannot be defined in a legal concept. On the contrary,
giving privacy a specific conceptual notion is helpful to better
comprehend and explore the value of privacy. The point is that
the methodology should be one that uses a “bottom-up culture
analysis” in de-constructing privacy issues and develops a map
to address various privacy controversies.205 The counterpart is
to give privacy a universal concept and to apply such a unified
concept top-down to all privacy issues,206 which this article does
not support. The rationale is that the value of privacy should
be understood in its interaction with the world in which one
lives.207 Based on the “bottom-up culture analysis” approach,
Professor Solove categorized four types of activities that are
likely to cause privacy harm.
The first type is potential privacy harm caused by
information collection.208For example, one may suspect that he
has been watched and may conduct a self-inspection and
change his work and life patterns.209 This type involves harm
that significantly affects one’s decisions about oneself and that
would force an individual to live in a highly emotionally
stressed situation, resulting in a negative impact on one’s
See generally Chang, supra note 191, at 156-59.
See HELEN NISSENBAUM, PRIVACY IN CONTEST: TECHNOLOGY, POLICY,
AND THE INTEGRITY OF SOCIAL LIFE 231 (2010).
205 See SOLOVE, supra note 168, at 172-73.
206 See id.
207 See id. at 173-74.
208
The “Information collection” category contains subcategories of
conduct relating to surveillance and interrogation. For a detailed
explanation, see id. at 106-17.
209 See id. at 108.
203

204
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mental and physical health.210
The second type relates to information processing, which is
also likely to cause privacy harm.211 Information aggregation is
an example. Fragmented information may not reveal too many
aspects of one’s personal life. However, the aggregation and
accumulation of personal information for a long period of time
and the combination of personal information with other
information has the potential to shape a comprehensive
personal profile.212 The hot topic of big data technology is one
of the applications of information aggregation technology. 213
The potential privacy harm related to information aggregation
is that it is unpredictable and puts data subjects in fear of an
unknown and uncontrollable risk of privacy harm.214
Information dissemination is the third type of act that
could result in privacy harm. Examples include unauthorized
disclosure of one’s criminal records, making the person with
such records unable to find a job or likely to be dismissed by
his/her employer, and unauthorized disclosure of others’ nude
photos, which may cause a disturbance to the person’s peace.215
See id.
“Information processing” contains subcategories of conduct relating to
aggregation, identification, insecurity, secondary use, and exclusion. For a
detailed explanation, see id. at 117-36.
212
See DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON: TECHNOLOGY AND
PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 1-7 (2004).
213
VIKTOR MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER & KENNETH CUKIER, BIG DATA: A
REVOLUTION THAT WILL TRANSFORM HOW WE LIVE, WORK, AND THINK 6 (2013)
(“There is no rigorous definition of big data. Initially the idea was that the
volume of information had grown so large that the quantity being “ examined
no longer fit into the memory that computers use for processing, so engineers
needed to revamp the tools they used for analyzing it all . . . . [O]ne way to
think about the issue today—and the way we do in the book—is this: big data
refers to things one can do at a large scale that cannot be done at a smaller
one, to extract new insights or create new forms of value, in ways that change
markets, organizations, the relationship between citizens and governments,
and more”); see also Woodrow Hartzog & Evan Selinger, Big Data in Small
Hands, 66 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 81, 81 (2013) (“‘Big data’ can be defined as a
problem-solving philosophy that leverages massive datasets and algorithmic
analysis to extract ‘hidden information and surprising correlations.’”).
214 See SOLOVE, supra note 168, at 118-19.
215
“Dissemination contemplates” contains subcategories of conduct
relating to breach of confidentiality, disclosure, exposure, increased
accessibility of information, blackmail, appropriation, and distortion of
information. For a detailed explanation, see Id. at 136-61; see also Hayley
Tsukayama, Toronto “”Police: There Have Been ‘Hate Crimes’ and Possible
210
211
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Invasion of a person’s body or space is also recognized as
an action that could endanger privacy because it is evident that
intrusion into one’s home would threaten the safety of the
people who live there.216
C. Concept of Information Privacy Combining Privacy
Harm and Privacy Interest
Privacy interest and privacy harm originate from different
contexts but overlap in most of their content. The major reason
is that where the interest exists is usually the place where
privacy harm arises. Most of the time, privacy interest and
privacy harm are addressed in different sequences. However,
when privacy interest relates to subjective emotional feelings,
such as whether one feels his personal affairs are disturbed,
this subjective feeling is not necessarily regarded as an
objective harm that is recognized by society.
In this
circumstance, the existence of privacy interest is not
tantamount to privacy harm.
If a privacy concept is purely developed based on privacy
interest, it is easier to draw a map that provides direction for
clear concepts of privacy. The opposite side of this approach is
that privacy interest may be broadly defined and therefore may
sacrifice other human rights and public benefits. In contrast, a
concept of privacy developed based on privacy harm without
considering privacy interest is subject to the risk of sacrificing
an individual’s privacy interest in pursuit of social benefits
because privacy harm may be invisible or ignored when there is
a greater goal of protecting society’s interest.
This article proposes that an integrated notion that
contains both privacy interest and privacy harm is a better
approach to comprehend privacy. Privacy harm and privacy
Suicides over the Ashley Madison Breach, WASH. POST, Aug. 24, 2015,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2015/08/24/torontopolice-there-have-been-hate-crimes-and-possible-suicides-over-the-ashleymadison-breach/ (The parent company of Ashley Madison, the adultery site,
was hacked and a large number of users data were stolen. Thereafter, there
have been “hate crimes” linked to the breach, as well as two unconfirmed
reports of suicides).
216 “Invasion” contains subcategories of conduct relating to intrusion and
decisional interference. For a detailed explanation, see SOLOVE, supra note
168, at 160-70.
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interest must be viewed as a whole instead of as separate
concepts.
Introducing privacy interest is a good way to explain the
positive side of privacy and why privacy is important for
individuals and society. This is a good approach to present the
concept of privacy in a way that people can understand.
Professor Solove introduced ten reasons why privacy requires
protection so that the concept of privacy can be easily
understood.217 As far as privacy harm is concerned, it plays an
important role in supporting the explanation that privacy
protection should not be an interest based only on an
individual’s subjective expectation of privacy; privacy harm
helps to determine whether privacy protection should be
granted when considering the objective standard of the
society. 218 Accordingly, the notion of privacy harm is an
important element in comprehending information privacy
because privacy harm must be viewed from the perspective of
whether privacy protection will hamper technological
advancement and the free flow of personal information. In
summary, the concept of privacy originated from the
presumption that privacy should be protected, and its content
is shaped by the integration of privacy interest and privacy
harm. When such an integrated concept of privacy applies to
privacy controversies and the formation of privacy policies, the
key issue is to determine whether privacy harm is caused after
balancing the privacy value at issue with the conflicting rights
or public interest.
For information privacy, it is true that the foundation of
217 See Daniel Solove, 10 Reasons Why Privacy Matters, LINKEDIN (Jan.
13,
2014),
http://www.linkedin.com/today/post/article/201401130449542259773-10-reasons-why-privacy-matters?trk=eml-ced-b-art-M-0&ut=35ks2y
Pax8pC41 (Noting ten reasons why privacy matters: “1. Limit on Power; 2.
Respect for Individuals; 3. Reputation Management; 4. Maintaining
Appropriate Social “Boundaries; 5. Trust; 6. Control Over One’s Life; 7.
Freedom of Thought and Speech; 8. Freedom of Social and Political Activities;
9. Ability to Change and Have Second Chances; 10. Not Having to Explain or
Justify Oneself.”).
218 SOLOVE, supra note 168, at 78 (“[P]rivacy value differs depending
upon the type of problem it protects against. Privacy problems impede certain
activities, and the value of privacy emerges from the value of preserving
these activities. Its value must be worked out as we balance it against
opposing interests.”).
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privacy interest is one’s right to control information about
oneself, but we cannot ignore the fact that the secrecy and
intimacy of different types of personal information represent
different degrees of interest in information privacy.219 Society’s
perspective on the secrecy and intimacy of certain personal
information leads to the determination of whether privacy
harm would be caused and the seriousness of such privacy
harm. Therefore, to construct a concept of information privacy,
the starting point should be the basic interest that requires
protection of information privacy, in which the focus is the
individual right to control over personal information. Based on
the above foundation, the next step is to examine other people’s
privacy interests, such as secrecy and intimacy. With this
understanding of multiple information privacy interests, the
focus then moves to privacy harm to shed light on the related
social context to determine whether the subjective information
privacy interest, despite involving one’s right to control over
personal information, would truly suffer privacy harm and
deserves privacy protection from society’s perspective.
We cannot ignore the social value of privacy rights.220 As
Professor Solove contends, “Privacy isn’t the trumpeting of the
individual against society’s interests but the protection of the
individual based on society’s own norms and values. Privacy
isn’t simply a way to extricate individuals from social control; it
is itself a form of social control that emerges from a society’s
norms.” 221 The above-mentioned Arab Spring proved that
privacy has an important function in fostering democracy;
therefore, the genuine value of privacy must include its social
aspect. The protection of privacy rights has a social value that
fosters democracy because people with privacy protection may
communicate with each other and express their views of the
government without concern about revenge or abuses of
government power.222 In Taiwan, the Criminal Investigation
Bureau (“CIB”) sought access to Taiwan’s nationwide highway
J.Y. Interp. No. 603, supra note 157, at reasoning ¶ 8.
See generally Chang, supra note 191, at 147-50.
221 DANIEL J. SOLOVE, NOTHING TO HIDE: THE FALSE TRADEOFF BETWEEN
PRIVACY AND SECURITY 50 (2011).
222 See REGAN, supra note 190, at 225-27; Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and
Democracy in Cyberspace, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1607, 1658 (1999).
219
220
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electronic toll collection (“ETC”) system database, which
functions as a massive vehicle surveillance program that
captures drivers’ location data. 223 The CIB asked the ETC
operator to turn over toll records in the name of crime
prevention.224 If the CIB’s indiscriminate gathering of personal
information is prone to abuse, such as attacks on political foes,
it will ultimately endanger democratic society. When the social
value of privacy is considered, the CIB’s desire to access all
drivers’ data should be prohibited unless the CIB can
demonstrate that the claimed public interest is greater than
the social value of democracy.225
This multi-faceted concept of information privacy combined
with the privacy harm approach wherein the respective social
contexts are evaluated form a complete concept of information
privacy to provide a practical solution for privacy disputes
arising from new technologies.
In Tsai, where health
information is involved, if the spotlight is on the individual
right to control his personal health information, whether one
has lost his control over his/her own data represents the entire
concept of information privacy protection. When one’s right to
control is deprived, under the control-based privacy theory, the
individual’s privacy right is also deprived. Under the
constitutional regime in the continental law system, human
rights can only be restricted for statutory reasons but cannot be
deprived.226 Applying this logic, one of the plaintiffs’ claims is
223 See 林志青 [Lin Zhi Qing], Yuǎn tōng 2 cì bàojià yōu gè zī fǎ dǎzhù
xíngshì jú chíxù xiétiáo (遠通 2 次報價憂個資法打住 刑事局持續協調) [PDPA
Concerns Halted FE-Toll Two Offers to CIB, Negotiation Continues],
PÍNGGUǑ RÌBÀO ( 蘋 果 日 報 ) [APPLE DAILY], Jan. 11, 2014,
http://www.appledaily.com.tw/realtimenews/article/new/20140111/324266/.
See Ye Zhi Jian (葉志堅), ETC Chéng jiānkòng xìtǒng?! Jǐng zhèng shǔ fāwén
jiānkòng quánmín (ETC 成監控系統？！ 警政署發文監控全民) [ETC Turns to
Be a Surveillance System?! The Criminal Investigation Bureau Sent Notice to
Monitor All Citizens], JĪNRÌ XĪNWÉN (今日新聞) [NOWNEWS] (Jan. 10, 2014),
http://www.nownews.com/n/2014/01/10/1085265.
225
See Chen-Hung Chang, Eyes on the Road Program in
Taiwan―Information Privacy Issues under the Taiwan Personal Data
Protection Act, 31 J. MARSHALL J. INFO. TECH. & PRIVACY L. 145, 170-85
(2015).
226 J.Y. Interp. No. 567, at reasoning ¶ 3 (Oct. 24, 2003) (Taiwan) (“While
the state may impose more restrictions on individual rights during
extraordinary periods and due to necessity under extraordinary
circumstances, such restrictions must nevertheless not exceed the boundaries
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reasonable－even if the defendant is allowed to reuse their
personal data, the plaintiffs may assert their right to
information control to demand that the defendant stop using
the data without their consent after discovering that their
health data were used in a manner to which the data subjects
did not consent. 227 If we agree that the plaintiffs’ right to
control over their personal health data is an absolute right,
there is no possibility that the NHIA may disclose health data
to other government agencies and academic institutions
without the data subjects’ consent. The NHIA cannot use these
personal data despite these data are used to conduct medical
research to provide more value for the society, such as
generating aggregated information to improve public health
services and to form better healthcare policies. The Tsai case
has illustrated that if information privacy is observed purely
from the perspective of individuals’ subjective interest in
retaining control over their personal information without
considering the likelihood of causing privacy harm, such a
conception of privacy will impede the development of
information technology and the pursuit of greater public
welfare.
This article proposes that the multi-faceted information
privacy value combined with the affirmation of privacy harm
can serve as an improved concept of privacy. This improved
concept can be helpful of balancing conflicts with other people’s
interests or public interest, providing a legal foundation in the
reform of current privacy laws and regulations, and responding
to the new privacy threats produced by new technologies.

of minimum human rights protection. Freedom of thought must be upheld to
safeguard the spiritual activities of the people, the root of human civilization
and the foundation of freedom of expression, and the most fundamental
human dignity the Constitution intends to protect. Given its particularly
crucial meaning to freedom, democracy and the continuance of the
constitutional rule of law, no government agencies may encroach upon [this
fundamental right] in the name of emergencies. Even in times of
extraordinary nature, and regardless of whether in the form of a statute,
invasion of the scope of minimum human rights is prohibited, be it with the
means to compel revelation or rehabilitation.),
translated in
http://www.judicial.gov.tw/constitutionalcourt/EN/p03_01.asp?expno=567.
227 Tsai v. NHIA, 2014 FǍ YUÁN FǍLǛ WǍNG (法源法律網) [LAWBANK], No.
102-Su-36 at reasoning ¶ iii (Taipei High Admin. Ct. May 14, 2014) (Taiwan).
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V. Applying the Modified Information Privacy Concept to
Tsai
In Tsai, the plaintiffs argued vigorously that they should
have the right to control over their personal health data. It
was difficult for them to accept the court’s judgement that the
NHIA may freely use their health data although they had
expressly voiced their privacy concerns and raised objections
against the NHIA’s disclosure of their data.
When the
plaintiffs gave their consent to the NHIA for the latter to
collect their personal health data, they were informed that the
health data were provided to receive the national health
insurance services. The NHIA did not inform them that the
health data would be used for medical research, and the
plaintiffs did not give consent to allow the use of the data for
these medical research purposes. The defendant NHIA did not
contest the absence of the plaintiffs’ written consent for the
data reuse and did not deny the fact that health data were used
for a purpose other than the purpose stated when the data
were collected. The NHIA’s main argument was that it was
using the health data for medical research, with the data duly
encrypted to the extent that it did not identify individuals
directly or indirectly.
The HIPAA Privacy Rule specifies three occasions on
which a data controller may disclose a natural person’s health
data for research purposes. First, a data controller may use or
disclose personal health data with authorization from the data
subject. If the data subject’s authorization is unavailable, the
second scenario is that the health data should be de-identified.
In this case, the data controller is not bound by the restrictions
of the Privacy Rule in using the personal data. When it is
necessary to retain health data as personally identifiable, the
available option is to obtain approval from an IRB or privacy
board. This article notes some problems in applying the three
conditions to the use of health data.
A. Unconditionally Requiring the Data Subject’s
Authorization will Become an Impediment to Medical Research
Rather than a Pathway for Privacy Protection
If privacy is viewed purely from the perspective of the
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individual’s right to control his own data, it offers little help in
protecting privacy and may undermine medical research. Most
information privacy protection legal systems in the main
jurisdictions were developed under the control–driven notion,
which focuses on the autonomy of the data subject in deciding
whether and how his data are used. One primary privacy
principle has been declared and complied with for decades,
which emphasize the notice-and-choice (informed consent)
doctrine to ensure that data subjects have full control over
their own data. 228 When modern technologies make it
impossible for a data subject to know when and how his data
are collected and used, it becomes questionable whether the
notice-and-choice approach is still workable and meaningful for
the benefit of privacy protection and innovation in
technology.229 The following paragraphs will explain why the
informed consent principle falls short of protecting the privacy
of personal health data in medical research projects.
1. Shifting the Burden of Privacy Protection to the Data
Subject Would Cause an Adverse Impact on Privacy Protection
There are drawbacks to universally requiring an
individual’s choice and consent for the use of health data for
research purposes. The first and foremost is that medical
research involves highly professional knowledge and is not an
easy concept for the general public to comprehend. It is also
very unlikely that anyone, after reading a few lines of a single
page of a privacy notice, can immediately detect the privacy
risks associated with the medical research in which the health
data will be used. Even though a privacy notice may be
thoroughly presented at length for several pages, no one is
likely to bother to read it. Even if some people attempt to read
the notice, the complicated and professional terms and
conditions are usually too difficult for people with no
professional background to understand. If it is not reasonably
228 See Helen Nissenbaum, A Contextual Approach to Privacy Online,
140 DAEDALUS 32, 34 (2011); Cate, supra note 6, at 1766 (“Many data
protection laws enacted since then have followed suit, relying on choice-often
together with notice necessary to support choice-as the key tool for protecting
privacy, or even as the goal of those laws”).
229 See Chang, supra note 191, at 141-45.
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expected that the message of privacy risks can be fully
communicated and understood by data subjects, consent by
data subjects means very little in relation to protecting the
data subjects’ privacy right. On the contrary, if the data
controller can use health data in any manner as long as the
data subject has given consent, a “blind” authorization will
endanger privacy protection.230
The notice-and-choice principle fails to consider situations
in which health information involves the personal privacy
interest of the data subject as well as the privacy interest of
other people or a specific group, especially genetic information.
In January 2007, a Taiwanese hospital (Mackay Memorial
Hospital) collected salivary samples from twenty-nine persons
who belonged to the Kavalan, one of Taiwan’s aboriginal tribes,
for biological research on the Taiwanese tribes and to examine
how the tribes are biologically related to each other. 231 The
collection of salivary samples was conducted with the
authorization of the test subjects. 232 However, many of the
Kavalan people (except for those who were willing to provide
their salivary samples for the research) have vigorously
contested the research project, alleging that this project
seriously violated the Indigenous Peoples Basic Act of
Taiwan.233 The battle came to an end after the hospital agreed
to stop the project and destroy all the salivary samples it had
obtained.234 In the Kavalan case, the Kavalan tribe had strong
standing to object to the biological research, for which twentynine Kavalan persons had given their consent, due to the
important factor that the salivary samples not only represent
the bodily features of the twenty-nine people but could also
reveal the biological information of all people with Kavalan
See Cate, supra note 6, at 1775-76.
See Chen Hui Hui (陳惠惠) and Chang Bo Dong (張柏東), Zūnzhòng
jīyīn chǎnquán mǎ xié xiāohuǐ yuán mín jiǎn tǐ (尊重基因產權 馬偕銷毀原民檢
體 ) [To respect the individuals’ right on genetic data, Mackay agreed to
destroy the indigenous peoples’ test samples], LIÁNHÉ BÀO (聯合報 ) [UNITED
DAILY NEWS] (Apr. 2, 2007), http://biobankforum.blogspot.tw/2009/05/blogpost_9724.html.
232 Id.
233 The Indigenous Peoples’ Basic Law (2015) (Taiwan),
http://db.lawbank.com.tw/Eng/FLAW/FLAWDAT01.asp?lsid=FL034022.
234 See Chen (陳) and Chang (張), supra note 234.
230
231
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blood. If the research results indicate certain genetic diseases
or disorders of the Kavalan tribe, once these results are
published, not only will the twenty-nine test subjects be
affected in many aspects of their lives, financially (such as a
possible increase in health insurance premiums) or emotionally
(such as carrying the reputation of being part of an unhealthy
tribe), but these adverse impacts will also affect the entire
Kavalan tribe.235
2. Ensuring Individuals’ Autonomy Right to Their Own
Data Does Not Guarantee Privacy Protection
The plaintiffs in Tsai alleged that the only legitimate way
to use personal health data in medical research is to obtain
authorization from the data subjects. The multi-dimension
privacy interest theory has demonstrated that an individual’s
right to make a decision about personal data represents only
one of the faces of privacy protection. Putting the entire
emphasis on an individual’s control over his personal
information fails to consider other dimensions of privacy
interests and cannot guard information for privacy protection.
Based on the pluralistic interest privacy theory that this
article has proposed, in the matter of information privacy, it is
not only the right of individual control over personal data that
deserves attention; it is also equally important to ensure the
secrecy and intimate relationships of personal data. Protecting
an individual’s right to control over personal data does not
guarantee protection of an individual’s information privacy.236
For example, one may give consent based on his own decision
that a hospital may use his health data; however, the hospital
may fail to establish and implement a data security system,
creating a loophole for hackers to compromise the hospital’s
database and steal the personal data.
This situation
demonstrates that an individual’s privacy right is not fully
protected simply because the individual has full control in
deciding who may collect and use his personal data.
When a person’ s right to control his data conflicts with the
public interest or other rights, the remedy is not to regain
235
236

See Gostin, supra note 2, at 489-92.
See Cate, supra note 6, at 1769.
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control over the data but to ensure that other parts of the
privacy interest are enhanced. The HIPAA Privacy Rule allows
the data controller to use health data for medical research by
obtaining approval from the IRB or privacy board in lieu of the
data subject’s consent. This is a step back for an individual’s
control over his data to make room for conflicting interests. In
the meantime, there should be proper measures to ensure that
other privacy interests are well protected. Although not
expressly indicated in the Privacy Rule, it is important that the
IRB and privacy board’s review processes should ensure the
secrecy of the data at issue. For example, to the greatest
extent possible, the data that will be used should be processed
in a manner that removes any personally identifiable
information as much as possible. It is also reasonable to
impose an enhanced data security standard on the data
controller considering that the data controller has been
exempted from the difficulty of obtaining the data subject’s
consent and the data subject is giving up his control over his
personal data. In particular, if the personal data have been deidentified to be exempted from the obligation to obtain
individual consent pursuant to the Privacy Rule, a balanced
privacy policy would require that the research institution
should be prohibited from recovering the de-identified personal
data into identified data.
3. A Balance Check Between Public Interest of Medical
Research and Threats to Privacy Protection
The notice-and-choice principle is impractical in an
internet-connected world. If the informed consent principle
must be adhered to in all matters, it is costly and timeconsuming to ensure that everyone has full control over the
flow of his personal information. 237 When considering the
benefits of protecting privacy, we should also take into account
the costs incurred and the lost opportunities for medical
research. An individual’s consent usually limits the scope and
manner in which the data controller may use or disclose the
data because the informed consent principle requires that the
notice cannot be too general and should clearly state the
237

See id. at 1776.

73

2 CHEN-HUNG CHANG (DO NOT DELETE)

102

PACE INT’L L. REV.

8/10/2016 9:50 AM

[Vol. 28:1

specific purpose regarding the data collection and use. This
one-topic or one-time consent or authorization, even if
obtained, cannot serve as a pathway for the use of the same
data for other research topics. This consent requirement
appears unrealistic for medical research because a research
topic is often inspired or derived from other research topics
that may not closely relate to the original purpose of collecting
the personal data. If it is mandatory for the data controller to
obtain new consent from the data subject to use or disclose
personal data for a new research project, this will inevitably
undercut the efficiency of medical research.238
In Tsai, at the time when the NHIA collected patients’
health data, the plan to establish a national health insurance
data center had not yet been proposed. If the informed consent
requirement were strictly complied with, the NHIA could not
use the patients’ health data in medical research projects
because the patients’ consent was limited to the provision of
medical services. Therefore, if the NHIA intends to establish a
national health insurance data center and it is necessary that
new consent is obtained from the patients as required by the
informed consent principle, the notice-and-consent process
would involve millions of people and incur enormous time and
expenses.
Moreover, if an individual’s consent is treated as the only
way for the data controller to use health data, a selection bias
of the data would lead to the failure of the research because the
data with consent may not be representative.239
To resolve the limitations the informed-consent
requirement has caused to the use of health data in medical
research, a possible solution is to compromise the self-decision
interest while offering individuals enhanced protection for
other parts of their privacy interest. This could be a balanced
approach in which the benefits contributed by medical research
outweigh the importance of protecting individuals’ control over
their data. The multi-faceted privacy theory supports this
approach. When one portion of the privacy interest cannot
See id. at 1789-90.
id. at 1791; Sharona Hoffman & Andy Podgurski, Balancing
Privacy, Autonomy, and Scientific Needs in Electronic Health Records
Research, 65 SMU L. REV. 85, 114-18 (2012).
238

239 See
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receive full protection (i.e., a loss of control over personal data),
a reasonable remedy could be to require the data controller,
who benefits from the use of personal data, to provide
enhanced protection for other portions of privacy interest, such
as data security. The privacy law may be improved to require
the data controller to implement a best practice to protect the
secrecy of the data it uses and to operate a safe and secure
environment for data storage to prevent data misuse or theft.
B. Applying a Privacy Harm Approach in Categorizing
Personal Data and Suitable Privacy Protection Standards
1. What Type of Personal Data are Protected in PDPA and
HIPAA?
In both Taiwan PDPA and the U.S. HIPAA, whether
personal data are personally identifiable serves as a
jurisdiction trigger. As far as health data are concerned, the
protected information in the Privacy Rule and the PDPA are
similar and refer to personally identified information and
personally identifiable information.
The PDPA distinguishes personal information into three
categories:
personally
directly
identified
(identified)
information, personally indirectly identified (identifiable)
information, and non-personally identifiable information (NonPII).240 Only the first two types of personal information (PII)
are protected by the PDPA, whereas Non-PII is excluded.
Similar to the PDPA, the HIPAA Privacy Rule limits its
protection to PII and further specifies the types of PII that are
protected in the Privacy Rule. The Privacy Rule defines
personally identifiable health information as follows: “Relates to
the past, present, or future physical or mental health or condition of
an individual; the provision of health care to an individual; or the
past, present, or future payment for the provision of health care to an
individual” and such information identifies the individual or can

be used to identify the individual. 241

240 Personal Information Protection Act art. 2, cl. 1 (2010) (Taiwan),
http://db.lawbank.com.tw/Eng/FLAW/FLAWDAT01.asp?lsid=FL010627.
241 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (definition of individually identifiable health
information).
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The PDPA defines personally directly identified
information as follows: “Information refers to an identified
person when it singles out a specific individual from others.”242
Citizenship ID card numbers and passport numbers are listed
as examples of identified information. Personally indirectly
identified information is defined as “other information which
may be used to identify a natural person indirectly” and
information that “cannot directly identify a specific person
without comparing to, combining with or connecting to other
information.”243 The Taiwanese court previously ruled that cell
phone users’ service provider information, as shown in
communication apps, should be regarded as personal
information in the PDPA. The court held that although the
phone service provider information alone cannot identify a
specific person, the service provider information combined with
the user’s cell phone number can identify a specific cell phone
user.244
To explain why the PDPA and HIPAA expressly excluded
Non-PII, 245 the harm-based approach to information privacy
theory could serve as the theoretical basis246 because the use or
disclosure of Non-PII is unlikely to cause privacy harm;
therefore, it is unnecessary to offer privacy protection for nonPII. A side issue this article has noted is that technological
advances have greatly increased the possibility of identifying
personal features from certain data. 247 Whether a piece of
information should be regarded as Non-PII might change from
time to time. The excluded Non-PII might be used to identify a
certain person with the help of modern information
242
Paul M. Schwartz & Daniel J. Solove, Reconciling Personal
Information in the U.S. and EU, 102 CALIF. L, REV. 877, 905 (2014).
243 Enforcement Rules of the Personal Information Protection Act art. 3
(2012) (Taiwan), http://db.lawbank.com.tw/Eng/FLAW/FLAWDAT01.asp?lsid
=FL010628.
244 Liu v. Taiwan Mobile, No. 103-Bei-Hsiao-1360, at reasoning ¶ iii
(Taipei Dist. Ct. Oct. 20, 2014) (Taiwan).
245 Schwartz & Solove, supra note 237, at 879.
246 See Fred H. Cate, Principles for Protecting Privacy, 22 CATO J. 33, 5354 (2003) (asserting that health privacy protection should focus on privacy
harm, not individual control over health data).
247 See Ohm, supra note 127, at 1716-27; Paul M. Schwartz & Daniel J.
Solove, The PII Problem: Privacy and a New Concept of Personally
Identifiable Information, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1814, 1841-45 (2011).
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technology. 248
This represents another issue related to
controversies in defining Non-PII.
2. How PII Is Regulated in PDPA and HIPAA Privacy Rule
The PDPA and HIPAA stipulate that both identified and
identifiable data are protected in both laws but fail to
differentiate the protection for these two main types of
personal data. Not all personal information is subject to equal
privacy risk. For instance, it is unreasonable to apply the same
privacy rules to an individual’s social security number
(identified information) and his phone carrier information
printed on a phone bill (identifiable information). When
personal information is categorized into several types―directly
identified, indirectly identified at low costs, indirectly
identified at high cost, and non-identifiable—this is an
acknowledgement of different privacy harms associated with
the respective types of data. The next issue is how to
determine the appropriate degree of privacy protection for
identified information compared to identifiable information.
To protect information privacy, the Organization for
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) declared in
the “Recommendation of the Council Concerning Guidelines
Governing the Protection of Privacy and Trans-border Flows of
Personal Data” eight principles, which are known as FIPPs: 1.
Collection Limitation Principle;249 2. Data Quality Principle;250
3. Purpose Specification Principle; 251 4. Use Limitation
248 Id. at 1704 (“reidentification science exposes the underlying promise
made by these laws-that anonymization protects privacy-as an empty one, as
broken as the technologists’ promises. At the very least, lawmakers must
reexamine every privacy law, asking whether the power of reidentification
and fragility of anonymization have thwarted their original designs.”).
249 Org. for Econ. Co-operation & Dev., Recommendation of the Council
Concerning Guidelines Governing the Protection of Privacy and Transborder
Flows of Personal Data, OECD Doc. C(80)(58)/FINAL, as amended on 11 July
2013 by C(2013)79, http://www.oecd.org/sti/ieconomy/2013-oecd-privacyguidelines.pdf (“There should be limits to the collection of personal data and
any such data should be obtained by lawful and fair means and, where
appropriate, with the knowledge or consent of the data subject.”).
250 Id. (“Personal data should be relevant to the purposes for which they
are to be used, and, to the extent necessary for those purposes, should be
accurate, complete and kept up-to-date.”).
251 Id. (“The purposes for which personal data are collected should be
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Principle; 252 5. Security Safeguards Principle; 253 6. Openness
Principle; 254 7. Individual Participation Principle; 255 8.
Accountability Principle. 256 These eight principles were recategorized by Professors Schwartz and Solove as follows:
(1) limits on information use; (2) limits on data collection (also
termed “data minimization”); (3) limits on disclosure of personal
information; (4) collection and use only of information that is
accurate, relevant, and up-to-date (“data quality principle”); (5)
notice, access, and correction rights for the individual; (6)
creation of processing systems that the concerned individual can
know about and understand (transparent processing systems);
and (7) security for personal data.257

The FIPPs fail to differentiate rules for identified and
identifiable information. 258 This one-size-fits-all approach is
likely to impede business development and does not enhance
privacy protection. Again, this article adopts the privacy harmspecified not later than at the time of data collection and the subsequent use
limited to the fulfillment of those purposes or such others as are not
incompatible with those purposes and as are specified on each occasion of
change of purpose.”).
252 Id. (“Personal data should not be disclosed, made available or
otherwise used for purposes other than those specified in accordance with
paragraph 9 except: a) with the consent of the data subject; or b) by the
authority of law.”).
253 Id. at 5 (“Personal data should be protected by reasonable security
safeguards against such risks as loss or unauthorized access, destruction,
use, modification or disclosure of data.”).
254
Id. (“There should be a general policy of openness about
developments, practices and policies with respect to personal data. Means
should be readily available of establishing the existence and nature of
personal data, and the main purposes of their use, as well as the identity and
usual residence of the data controller.”).
255 Id. (“Individuals should have the right: a) to obtain from a data
controller, or otherwise, confirmation of whether or not the data controller
has data relating to them; b) to have communicated to them, data relating to
them i. within a reasonable time; ii.at a charge, if any, that is not excessive;
iii.in a reasonable manner; and iv.in a form that is readily intelligible to
them; c) to be given reasons if a request made under subparagraphs (a) and
(b) is denied, and to be able to challenge such denial; and d) to challenge data
relating to them and, if the challenge is successful to have the data erased,
rectified, completed or amended.”).
256 Id. (“A data controller should be accountable for complying with
measures which give effect to the principles stated above.”).
257 Schwartz & Solove, supra note 237, at 909.
258 See id.
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based approach to review this issue. Unlike identified personal
data (e.g., social security numbers), identifiable personal data
(e.g., phone carrier information printed on a phone bill) cannot
directly identify a certain person and is not subject to the same
risk of privacy harm as identified information. It is therefore
unnecessary to impose the full set of FIPPs restrictions on the
use of identifiable information in view of the lower privacy
risks and to balance the benefits of the free flow of information.
With regard to the question of which privacy principles should
apply, the point should be that if personal information has a
higher likelihood of identifying a person and an individual is
subject to a higher risk of privacy harm if such information is
improperly used or disclosed, more privacy protection measures
should be offered to protect the person’s control over his
personal data. For example, the use limitation principle or the
purpose specification principle, which was devised to ensure
that an individual can decide whether and how his data can be
used and makes sense in the case of identified personal data,
may be relaxed for identifiable information.259 The reason is
that the benefits for a person’s control over his personally
identifiable information are not as great as they are for his
personally identified information.
The Google Flu Trends project is an example that
demonstrates the need to lift certain FIPPs restrictions to
benefit social welfare through the massive collection and use of
personal health data. Google Flu Trends is a project that was
launched by Google in 2008 to test the theory that “one might
predict the parts of the world suffering from flu outbreaks by
watching the symptoms people type into the Google search
engine.”260 When launching the project, Google attempted to
prove that “it can detect likely flu outbreaks a week or two
faster than the physician-reporting surveillance efforts of the
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.”261 Google failed
See id. at 909-10 (holding a similar opinion).
Paul Ohm, Response, The Underwhelming Benefits of Big Data, 161
U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 339, 341 (2013).
261 Id. at 342 (questioning that the benefits Google claimed might not be
real benefits—”Has a traveler ever avoided boarding a plane to a city on a
distant coast because of the relative difference in the shading of the oranges
between home and destination?” The project’s primary mission was to market
Google.).
259
260
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to comply with the informed consent principle and did not offer
people the choice to decide whether to trade their health data
(i.e., medical symptoms) to help save lives.262 Google stipulates
in its privacy policy that the Google search engine service and
the Gmail service collect user information to improve Google
services, such as enhancing Google’s search results and
blocking spam messages. 263 Although the original idea
underlying Google’s collection of user information was to
improve the search engine and electronic email services, the
collected data were later used for another purpose: to predict
the parts of the world suffering from flu outbreaks. Applying
Taiwan’s PDPA to the “Google Flu Trends” project, Google
would have violated the informed consent and use limitation
principle when using personal data for purposes to which the
subjects did not agree. The Google Flu Trends project shows
that when the data controller violates the informed consent
principle, it cannot use personal data in any manner, no matter
what types of data it wants to use. If privacy rules can be
differentiated depending on the respective types of data, Google
might contend that the medical symptoms it has collected,
processed and used are identifiable information. Accordingly,
the informed consent principle, use limitation principle,
purpose specification principle or other individual participation
right may not be applicable.
The multi-faceted information privacy theory supports a
differentiated privacy protection regime for personally
identifiable information. Although it is inevitable that an
individual’s control over his personal data is reduced to protect
other people’s rights or to pursue public interests, the
individual’s privacy right can still be protected from other
angles of privacy, such as the secrecy and safety of the personal
data. The HIPAA Privacy Rule allows the data controller to
use or disclose PHI in research without obtaining the data
subject’s authorization if such use or disclosure of PHI is
conducted with an IRB waiver. Evidently, the data subject has
lost his decision-making right when providing his PHI. In the
meantime, the remedy to protect the data subject’s privacy is to
ensure that his data are kept confidential by the data
262
263

See id. at 339.
See Cate, supra note 6, at 1794.
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controller. It is therefore reasonable that in the IRB’s review
process, the IRB should ascertain that the data controller has
complied with other FIPPs requirements, such as the review of
practicability and minimal risk.264
3. A Suggested Approach to Regulating Identifiable Health
Information in the Use of Medical Research
A possible approach to aid medical research is to lift
certain FIPPs restrictions for the data controller to use PII.
Medical research requires a substantial volume of personal
information. When more efficiency and flexibility are offered to
researchers to collect and use personal data without abiding by
stringent data use restrictions, certain part of the information
privacy right is compromised. The privacy harm approach
would be helpful to evaluate what types of data and which
parts of privacy rights may be compromised in exchange for the
benefits to medical research.
For example, personally
identifiable information involves less privacy harm risk than
personally identified information, and the data use restrictions
applicable to personally identified information may be lifted in
the case of personally identifiable information.
Among personally identifiable information, health data
would require greater privacy protection than other types of
identifiable information. For an AIDS patient, the exposure of
his sensitive health information “can be stigmatizing, and can
cause embarrassment, social isolation, and a loss of selfesteem.”265 This situation illustrates that identifiable health
information is subject to a higher risk of privacy harm
compared to other kinds of identifiable personal information
and therefore requires a higher degree of privacy protection.
As such, although personally identifiable information may be
subject to fewer restrictions on data use when compared to
personally identified information, it should be noted that
personally identifiable health information requires a higher
level of privacy protection than other general identifiable
personal information.
Based on the multi-faceted privacy theory and the risk of
264
265

See Gostin, supra note 2, at 490.
45 C.F.R. § 164.514(e)(2) (2015).
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harm approach that this article has proposed, FIPPs should be
flexible to balance the various conflicting privacy interests and
the possible risk of privacy harm. Below is an analysis of one
of the FIPPs’ widely known principles, the informed consent
principle.
According to the HIPAA Privacy Rule, one of the means of
using a natural person’s data is by obtaining the data subject’s
consent, which is known as the informed consent principle.
The informed consent principle comes at a price; it is costly for
the data controller to comply with the informed consent
principle. In view of the difficulties for a data controller to
obtain subjects’ consent, especially when millions of data
subjects are involved, the Privacy Rule offers two more
alternatives. One is to obtain an IRB’s (or privacy board’s)
waiver after the IRB’s review of the research proposal. The
other option is to prove that the data at issue are nonidentifiable information (Non-PII) and that there is no need to
obtain the data subjects’ authorization.
The limited data set information principle in the Privacy
Rule offers another possibility for a data controller to use
personal data without an individual’s consent. Applying the
limited data set, it is not mandatory that all eighteen
enumerated personal identifiers are removed; personal
information such as town or city, state, and zip code, the birth
date and month of the data subject may be retained.266 The
disclosure and use of limited data set information, compared to
other types of identifiable information, is subject to a different
set of rules. The covered entities may disclose or use the
limited data set information, which is identifiable information,
without obtaining authorization from the data subjects.267 In
summary, a certain flexibility has been implemented in the
Privacy Rule to accommodate the interest of using personal
data in medical research.
Although the Privacy Rule does not explicitly offer
different requirements for informed consent depending on
whether the personal data at issue are personally identified or
identifiable information, the limited data set principle has

266
267

Id.
Id. at (e)(4)(ii)(C).
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inspired such a possibility. Specifically, when establishing the
limited data set information principle, legislators have
observed that there is a higher risk for limited data set
information to identify a specific person than Non-PII. Given
that certain informed consent requirements are exempted, the
Privacy Rule requires a higher degree of data security to
ensure the secrecy of the data, including requiring the data
controller to commit to the safe use of the data and to ensure
that it will not take any measures to re-identify the data
subjects.268
For medical research, it is worth considering whether the
widely used key-coded medical data may be exempted from the
informed consent requirements while other protections are
enhanced. Key-coded medical data are one type of classic
identifiable information used in the medical community.269 In
Tsai, the NHRI alleged that the health data had been
encrypted and stored in the data center in the form of keycoded data. The personal health data were stored in the
National Health Insurance Research Database center in the
format of key-coded data, which does not directly identify a
specific person. 270 Key-coded data, when de-coded, may reidentify a specific person and should be regarded as identifiable
Information. Pursuant to the Privacy Rule, the data controller
should obtain the data subjects’ authorization before it may
See Schwartz & Solove, supra note 237, at 907.
Tsai v. NHIA, FǍ YUÁN FǍLǛ WǍNG (法源法律網) [LAWBANK], No. 102Su-36 at reasoning ¶ v (Taipei High Admin. Ct. May 14, 2014) (Taiwan)
http://www.lawbank.com.tw.
270 See Schwartz & Solove, supra note 237, at 909; Suzanne M. Rivera,
Privacy v. Progress: Research Exceptionalism Is Bad Medicine, 24 HEALTH
MATRIX: J. L.-MED. 49, 62 (2014) (“Disqualifying the use of de-identified data
originally collected for research purposes unless subjects are re-consented
would be a mistake for three reasons. First, it is illogical. How can you obtain
consent from people when you do not know their identities? Secondly, not
using existing data would require collection of new data, meaning more
people than necessary must be studied to answer important questions. This is
wasteful (an injustice, with regard to the distribution of limited resources)
and unnecessarily exposes more people to the risk of harm (a violation of
beneficence). Finally, it seems to ignore common sense. While patients may
have no knowledge (outside of the standard HIPAA warning) that their data
can be used for research, subjects who previously have consented to
participate in research actually know and agreed that their data can be used
for science (and presumably would be more agreeable for further study
usage).”).
268
269
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provide key-coded data for others in medical research.
However, because the risk and possible privacy harm for the
key-coded data are relatively low if the data are not reidentified, it is worth reexamining whether it is necessary to
apply the informed consent requirements to the key-coded
data. It is even worth considering whether it is possible that
identifiable information may be exempted from the informed
consent principle. Without the difficulty of obtaining the
required informed consent, this approach might not increase
the risk of privacy harm and might provide enhanced privacy
protection. For example, if it is mandatory that the covered
entity comply with the informed consent principle before it may
disclose key-coded data for others to conduct research, this
approach forces the covered entity to re-identify the individuals
by transferring the identifiable information to identified
information. Without the re-identified data to know who
should be informed about the contemplated research, it is not
possible for the data controller to obtain the data subjects’
consent. The re-identification process itself actually increases
the risk of privacy harm.271
This article proposes that if information is identifiable, the
unnecessary FIPPs that are only essential for an individual’s
right to make decisions may be relaxed. The remedy of the
relaxed restrictions is the enhanced protection of other parts of
privacy interests, including the security and secrecy of the
personal information. Furthermore, in view of the sensitive
nature of health data, a higher degree of privacy protection
should be provided. Lifting certain restrictions to facilitate
data use for identifiable health information is unlikely to
undercut the protection of the privacy of health information
while making it possible to uphold the public interest through
medical research. It is also true that identifiable health
information requires a higher degree of privacy protection
compared to other kinds of identifiable personal information. A
compromise and a balance check mechanism could require a
neutral and professional body to verify that there is a public
interest behind the contemplated research and to guard the
privacy rights of individuals. It is important that this review

271

PDPA, supra note 17, at § 16(5).
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process is intended to ensure that there is public interest for
the medical research. This is different from the HIPAA
Privacy Rule, in which the use and disclosure of
identified/identifiable health information is acceptable with the
IRB’s (or privacy board’s) approval of a waiver of authorization
in lieu of the data subject’s authorization.
This suggestion may help with the review process of the
IRB or privacy board. Pursuant to the Privacy Rule, identified
and identifiable health information are subject to the same
rules. In other words, in the absence of the data subject’s
consent, the disclosure and use of identifiable health
information for research should comply with the same IRB
review process as the process that applies to identified health
information. It is inevitable that the IRB will be overloaded,
undercutting the efficiency of the review process. Given this
situation, this article has proposed that identifiable health
information may be subject to a simplified IRB review process
so that the data controller may use health data in research as
long as the IRB has confirmed that the proposed research is for
medical research to pursue public interest.
C. Analysis of Tsai
The core issue of Tsai relates to the evaluation of the
plaintiff’s privacy rights in medical research. The defendant
NHIA exercised its official duty － performing health care
services－when collected citizens’ health data, including those
of the eight plaintiffs.
The NHIA then disclosed and
transferred these health data to the NHRI and CCHIA to
process the health data to establish a National Health
Insurance Research Database center, which is obviously a new
purpose other than the one for which the data were collected.
The data stored in the data center were accessible by the public
upon application. The plaintiffs argued that based on their
right to information privacy, the defendant should cease using
their personal health data. The plaintiffs further claimed that
although the NHIA argued that the data were encrypted and
transformed into key-coded data, these data could be de-coded
to link to their personal identity.
The HIPAA Privacy Rule does not allow the NHIA to use
the plaintiffs’ personal data without their consent. Assuming
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that the NHIA is the covered entity under the Privacy Rule,
the encrypted data at issue did not qualify as non-PII or
“limited data set” information because the key-coded
information could be used to identify the individuals. Pursuant
to the Privacy rule, without the plaintiffs’ consent or the IRB’s
waiver, the data controller cannot disclose or use the health
data for medical research. When the NHIA transferred the
plaintiffs’ health data to the NHRI and CCHIA, no IRB review
process was conducted. Given this situation, had the court
ruled on Tsai pursuant to the Privacy Rule, the defendant
would have lost the case.
On the contrary, the Taiwan court ruled in favor of the
NHRI because the NHRI qualified for the safe harbor element
for the data controller to use personal data without the data
subjects’ consent. Item 5, Article 16 of the Taiwan PDPA
provides that a data controller may use personal data for
medical research if and when such data are processed to the
extent that they cannot be used to identify a specific person.272
This is one of the exceptions where the data controller may use
personal data without the data subjects’ consent. It is evident
that this exception should not apply to personally identified
information. The next issue is whether the NHIA’s allegedly
encrypted data should be regarded as identifiable information
or Non-PII.
The plaintiffs alleged the former because
encrypted data can be re-identified and claimed that defendant
did not enjoy the safe harbor of Non-PII. It is difficult to deny
that there is a possibility for identified information to be reidentified. Nonetheless, the privacy harm approach may come
into play to evaluate how such encrypted data should be
protected.
The encrypted key-coded information, as
identifiable information, indicates the likelihood that such
information may be used to identify a certain person. However,
there is no imminent danger or threat that personal identity
will be exposed as soon as the information is disclosed or used.
We cannot ignore the fact that the disclosure or use of keycoded information does not result in the same privacy risk as
personally identified information. As such, it is unnecessary to
272 Tsai v. NHIA, FǍ YUÁN FǍLǛ WǍNG (法源法律網) [LAWBANK], No. 102Su-36 at reasoning ¶ v (Taipei High Admin. Ct. May 14, 2014) (Taiwan),
http://www.lawbank.com.tw.
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apply the informed consent requirement to key-coded
information.
This article proposes that a reasonable
interpretation of “processed to the extent unable to identify a
certain person” in Item 5, Article 16 of the PDPA should
include Non-PII and personally identifiable information. In
other words, it is unnecessary for the data to be processed to
the extent that it is “not personally identifiable” to qualify for
the exception. Based on this interpretation, the key-coded
health information may qualify for the exception of Item 5,
Article 16 of the PDPA. Furthermore, with reference with
other articles of the PDPA, it makes no sense to limit the Item
5, Article 16 exception to “not personally identifiable”
information only. Pursuant to Item 1, Article 2 of the PDPA,
“not personally identifiable” information was excluded from the
PDPA at the outset. The data controller may freely use “not
personally identifiable” information without qualifying for the
Item 5, Article 16 exception. In other words, Item 5, Article 16
of the PDPA would be meaningless if it were interpreted to
refer to solely to “not personally identifiable” information.
The NHRI argued that the plaintiffs’ health data were
encrypted and that these data were not personally identifiable
and should be exempted from the PDPA.273 This argument was
accepted by the court, which held that the encrypted data were
not indirectly or directly identifiable to the plaintiffs. The
court also accepted the defendant’s argument that Item 5,
Article 16 of the PDPA would allow the defendant to use the
health data for medical research without the plaintiffs’
consent.274 This article notes that the NHRI, NHIA and the
court erred in treating key-coded information as nonidentifiable information when they contended and ruled that
the defendant may use the data without the plaintiffs’ consent.
The analysis in this article leads to the same conclusion
that the defendant may use the plaintiffs’ health data without
their authorization, but the reasoning is different. This article
takes the position that to qualify for the exception in Item 5,
Article 16 of the PDPA, “personally identifiable information”
would suffice. The encrypted health data should be regarded

273
274

Id. at reasoning ¶ vii.
Id. at reasoning ¶ vi.

87

2 CHEN-HUNG CHANG (DO NOT DELETE)

116

PACE INT’L L. REV.

8/10/2016 9:50 AM

[Vol. 28:1

as identifiable information. Moreover, because the personal
data at stake were reused for public interest and the data were
processed to the extent that they were not directly identifiable
for any specific person, the plaintiffs had no legal standing to
object to the defendant’s disclosure of their data. If such
identifiable health information is re-identified to become
identified health information, the data controller is still bound
by the restrictions of the use of identified health information,
as provided in the IRB review process.275
VI. Conclusion
Information technology has played an important role in the
evolution of information privacy theory.
The recently
developed big data technology greatly transformed the way
health information is used in medical research. Investments
are increasingly made to develop big health data centers, of
which the Taiwan National Health Insurance Database center
is one example. Traditional privacy theory has fallen short of
reconciling privacy conflicts between information privacy and
medical research arising from new technologies, and it is time
to consider a modified approach to properly address privacy
concerns. By analyzing the issues associated with Tsai, this
article proposed a multi-faceted privacy theory and a harmbased information privacy approach to address the privacy
concerns caused by modern technology. With the rapid pace of
technological development, privacy theory may need to be
modified from time to time. The modified privacy theory
proposed in this article may serve as a starting point and basis
for future discussion when future technology changes call for
further amendments to privacy theory.

275

Id. at reasoning ¶ vi.
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